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"
Introduction 
"
The latest financial crisis has traumatized the global financial markets. 
The causes of the crisis are complex and multiple and credit risk management has 
played a decisive role in the events that triggered this crisis. Therefore, in the recent 
years, new techniques and new methods for measuring credit risk have been 
developed. 
In order to stay competitive, to raise capital for growth opportunities, “to reduce the 
chance of default and the cost of financial distress” (Smith and Stulz, 1985), agencies 
banks and firms are trying to apply and enforce these methods in innovative ways. 
Besides, the crisis has shown how having a good credit rating is not a guarantee of 
good financial health of a firm. It is therefore questionable how effectively ratings are 
formulated and if credit models are truly reliable. 
The need to develop new systems for the risk measurement is then due to: 
- financial crisis; 
- unexpected company default; 
- increasing number of new markets (i.e. derivative markets) and continuous 
development of credit derivatives; 
- increasing volatility;  
- regulatory reasons; 
- increasing credit risk and counterpart risk involved in the majority of OTC 
transactions. 
"
Nevertheless several models have been developed for hedging out the default risk, 
these models are not sufficiently adequate to deal with the complex and confused 
uncertain randomness of financial markets. For example, most approaches rely on the 
market efficient hypothesis (EMH), according to which all information should be 
incorporated into the prices. But it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the strong 
form of EMH does not hold in the real world: markets are not efficient neither well 
informed . 1
The full understanding of credit risk models, such as Merton’s and MKMV’s, 
preliminarily requires both the definition of insolvency and then a quick analysis of the 
theoretical context in which the model itself was developed. 
Let’s start giving a definition of credit risk (also named default risk) and then move 
within this to examine the Merton approach on the determination of the probability of 
default according to the principle of contingent claim analysis from which the model is 
inspired. 
"
 Credit risk and default event 
Risk, by definition, is a situation involving exposure to danger, possibility of financial 
loss. 
Credit risk refers to the risk that a firm does not meet its debts on time. Basel 
Committee defines credit risk as “the risk that a borrower will default on any type of 
debt by failing to make required payments ”. 2
Usually, default of a firm is associated with its bankruptcy, a legal term that exhibits 
inability to pay own debts. However, default is different from bankruptcy: the latter is 
when the firm is liquidated, the former is an event in which the firm cannot meet its 
financial obligation. For example, a firm could have a financial situation that makes it 
insolvent at a particular time, but may not be at the time in which it is declared 
insolvent from rating agencies. 
This variety of notions above described is in agreement with Moody’s definition: they 
assert that corporate default is triggered by one of these three events: 
1. a bankruptcy filing  
 “The market does not reflect accurately all the information in the financial statements”, Sloan, 1996.1
 Principles for the Management of Credit Risk, Final document, Basel Committee on Banking 2
Supervision, BIS Sep.2000, Retrieved 13 September 2013.
2. a distressed exchange where old debt is exchanged for new debt that represents 
smaller obligation for the borrower 
3. a missed or delayed interest or principal payment 
Finally, there is another “empirical” definition, according to structural models: 
straightforwardly, default occurs when the value of the assets is smaller than a barrier, 
identified as the default point. The crucial matter is the estimation of this barrier, 
which may be deterministic or stochastic. 
From now on, we identify default as described just above: when the value of assets is 
smaller than the default point, a firm will default. 
"
Once it is clear what we mean by default event, it can be easily understood the 
impossibility of establishing a priori whether a company will default or not at a certain 
date in the future, since we not may know in advance whether it will be able to meet 
its debt or not. 
Forecasting is predicting future using the information we have today, at present day. 
The decisions we make today, will affect the future events. Ultimately, default events 
are unpredictable and costly and the best we can do it is to calculate the probability 
these events will happen. 
"
In this thesis, structural models are described, with particular attention to Merton 
model and its implementations and a new indicator, the distance to default ratio, is 
illustrated. The main purpose of this work is then to investigate if this new measure of 
default risk is a good indicator of financial distress as well as if it has any forecasting 
power. 
"
The structure of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 describes the Merton 
model and the notion of the distance to default ratio, after a quick introduction to 
default forecasting models; Chapter 2 focuses on the MKMV model, one of the 
modern credit risk qualitative measuring models, its methodology and the expected 
default frequency (EDF); Chapter 3 describes the methodology we used in our 
analysis, the parameters estimation as well as a description of the data sample; in 
Chapter 4 we present and discuss our results. 
The last part contains summary statistics of the most important inputs/outputs of the 
models, followed by conclusions. 
Besides, two appendices concerning volatility calculation and the Matlab codes are 
provided at the end of this work.  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1. Merton Model 
"
"
 1.1    Default forecasting model 
"
At present, in the finance literature, there are three different approaches for estimating 
credit risk: the structural approach, the reduced-form approach and the incomplete 
information approach. Each approach uses different methods and relies on different 
assumptions.  
Despite of the existence of several and different methods of managing credit risk, 
measuring credit risk is not an easy task since data used by agencies and credit risk 
modelers are confidential and not available publicly. 
Below in details the different approaches above mentioned. 
"
"
  1.1.1    Structural approach 
"
Also known as contingent claim approach or option pricing approach, the structural 
model is so called because the default probability is based on the liability structure of a 
firm and credit risk is driven by the firm value process. For this reason, these models 
are also known as “firm-value” models. 
“Structural model means it has the characteristics of describing the internal debt 
structure of a company where default is a consequence of an internal event”.  3
The main purpose of these approaches is to provide a relationship between default risk 
and  the capital structure of the firm. 
The structural model is very simple in its idea. If the firm’s asset value (V) is below the 
default point (DP), we can predict the firm default. However, prior the default event, 
!13
 Saunders, A. & Allen, L., 2002, Credit Risk Measurement: New Approaches to Value at Risk and 3
Other Paradigms, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NewYork, p.49
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there is no way to discriminate between risky firms and stable firms. Indeed the 
complexity comes up when trying to predict default into the future, at the end of the 
period considered. A good predicting model would avoid additional costs and gain a 
better portfolio performance. For example, banks usually use default prediction 
models for loans applications and capital allocation purposes. 
In structural models, default is seen as an exogenous event, which depends on the 
behavior of the firm’s value during a specified period of time. The idea of applying the 
option pricing theory to the problem of bond valuation and other credit risk exposures 
goes back to the intuition of Merton in 1974: the firm’s equity value is simply a 
European call option on the asset value V and default can only happen at maturity T. 
Examples of structural models are: Merton model, Black and Cox model (1976), KMV 
model. 
"
In the Merton model, assumptions are made on the dynamics of the firm’s assets value, 
on its capital structure and on its debt. The firm’s asset value V is assumed to follow a 
Geometric Brownian Motion, the capital structure is relatively simple and it supposes 
the firm has just one zero coupon debt issue. 
Simply, a firm defaults when V is below some threshold (the default boundary), 
interpreted as a liability. 
However, these assumptions given above, imply many important consequences and 
also represent at the same time the two most obvious limitations of the study 
conducted by Merton. Firstly and perhaps most importantly, considering the debt 
structure of the firm as a zero coupon bond implies that a firm’s default may occur 
only at maturity (when the face value of the debt F is higher than the asset value V). 
Secondly, the assumption on the dynamic of V leads to the fact that the probability of 
default is predictable in relation to the given time horizon, since it is predictable the 
evolution of V (advantages and disadvantages of Merton’s model are described in the 
next paragraph). 
!14
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Such limits are the main reason that led to the subsequent generalizations of the 
Merton model. Among them, we first recall Black and Cox (1976). 
Their study is important mainly due to the fact that considers the possibility that 
default can occur even before T, if the assets value drops below a certain level: in other 
words, default can occur at any time.  
However, the assumptions on V are the same as Merton’s. 
A similar approach to those just stated is the Credit Monitor Model developed by 
KMV Corporation. Default occurs when the assets value is below the default point, 
which is somewhere between short-term liabilities and long-term liabilities. 
"
The main advantage of the structural approaches is that they are simple to understand 
and they provide a very intuitive picture as well as an endogenous explanation of the 
default event (this means that the default event is derived from the model). 
Disadvantages can be identified in its difficulty of implementation analytically and 
computationally . Furthermore, since structural models depend on the firm’s asset 4
value (V) and on the volatility of the firm ( ! ) and neither is directly observable, a 
clear difficulty is their calibration. Another shortcoming is that the basic assumptions 
are unrealistic, they do not reflect the reality of financial markets. In the end, if the 
capital structure of the firm is complicated (and asset prices are not easily observable 
as they assume), these questionable assumptions fail and these models cannot be used. 
Lastly, most structural models assume complete information in order to give a better 
explanation of a firm performance (but this is a very oversimplified hypothesis). 
Structural approaches assume that practitioners have the same information of firm’s 
manager whereas reduced-form models assume they only have the information 
incorporated into the market, regardless of the knowledge of liabilities value and asset 
value of the firm. 
"
"
σV
!15
 “Structural models are also computationally burdensome”, Bo Liu, A. E. Kocagil, G. M. Gupton, 4
Fitch Equity Implied Rating and Probability of Default Model, June 13, 2007, FitchSolutions.
1.   Merton Model
  1.1.2    Reduced-form approach 
"
The reduced-form approach is a relatively recent method of estimating credit risk, 
where default is considered as an exogenous “unexpected” event, not linked to the 
capital structure of the firm. 
This kind of perspective is more general. Unlikely the structural approach, it does not 
assume any particular model of the firm’s liability structure. This method considers 
default as an exogenous event (refers to assumptions specified outside the model) and 
considers default as a random variable driven by a stochastic process (typically 
assumes  a Poisson’s process). Default may happen at any point in time, there is no 
explanation in terms of fundamental quantities and firm’s default time is 
unpredictable. 
The reduced-form models are characterized by flexibility: this is a strength and a 
weakness at the same time. They are entirely data driven and generally produce better 
results for credit risk pricing than structural models. 
Example of reduced-form models are CreditMetrics (also known as RiskMetrics) and 
! . The former, based on an insurance approach, models default as a 
continuous variable with an underlying probability distribution. The main 
disadvantage of this approach is that all firms within the same rating class have the 
same default rate which is equal to the historical average default rate (since 
probabilities are calculated on the average historical frequency of defaults). 
In the latter, default happens as a surprise (at any point in time), since the default event 
is exogenous. !  is easy to implement and very attractive from a 
computational point of view but it ignores the migration risk (the probability and value 
impact of changes in default probability ) and the market risk since interest rates are 5
assumed to be deterministic.  
In these kind of approaches default time is modeled so as to be independent from the 
underlying securities or from interest rates. 
CreditRisk+
CreditRisk+
!16
 Definition from Modeling Default Risk, P. Crosbie and J. Bohn, Moody’s KMV, December 2003.5
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  1.1.3    Incomplete information approach 
"
It is a combination of the two above mentioned approaches, it is a kind of hybrid 
model. 
An example of incomplete information approach is CreditRatings: rating agencies 
collect information from the market and from financial statements in order to 
“evaluate” companies and assign them a rating class (credit quality) from AAA to D. 
After that, default probabilities are estimated for each group and all firms with the 
same rating category have the same probability of default. This methodology allows 
the efficient use of information and allows financial institution to estimate the default 
probabilities of all their clients. However, there are some aspects of this method that 
investors do not like, such as the fact that agencies do not change so often the ratings 
of a company (ratings are adjusted in a discrete fashion whereas default rates evolve 
continuously) and these judgments are not always reliable (the recent financial crisis is 
such a proof ). 6
"
Clearly, all modeling framework have their own set of advantages and disadvantages. 
In a survey , conducted in 2002, a number of firms were asked whether they were 7
using a portfolio model and which model. About 85% of the respondents indicated that 
they were using a credit portfolio model. 
The table below summarizes the responses : 8
"
"
!17
 Emblematic was the case of Lehman Brothers, a global financial service firm: in 2007 it was ranked 6
the #1 “Most Admired Security Firm” by Fortune Magazine; in 2008, on the 18th of July its stocks 
seemed to have high reliability as confirmed by the most famous rating’s agencies: A by 
Standard&Poor’s, A2 by Moody’s, A+ by FitchRatings. Two months later, on the September 15, the 
company declared bankruptcy.
 Smithson, Survey of Credit Portfolio Management Practices, 2002.7
 These responses sum to more than 100%, because some respondents checked more than one model.8
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"
"
 1.2    Literature review 
"
Lots of researchers have examined the contribution of the Merton model over the past 
years. A question still open for discussion among academics is which modeling 
approach has a better forecast power. 
There is not an absolute answer to that questions. Many factors should be taken into 
account and an empirical evaluation is strictly necessary in order to test each model 
and identify strength and weakness of each method in measuring credit risk. 
Arora, Boh, Zhu (2005) tested structural models (Merton and Vasicek-Kealhofer 
model) and reduced-form model (Hull-White model) to understand if they have any 
predictive power and which approach is better in discriminating defaulting firms from 
non-defaulting firms. They found that VK and HW models outperform the Merton 
model. Moreover, they point out that Merton’s is not good enough to discriminate 
defaulting and non-defaulting firms. 
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1995) and Hull and White (2000) presented detailed 
explanations of several reduced-form approaches. 
Table 1: Survey’s result
CreditMetrics 20%
CreditRisk+ 0%
KMV’s Portfolio Manager 69%
Macro Factor Model (developed internally or by 
a vendor)
6%
MCKinsey’s CreditPortfolioView 0%
Internally developed model (other than a macro 
factor model)
17%
!18
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Hilscher, Jarrow and van Deventer  said that “the reduced-form approach can never be 9
less accurate then the Merton approach”. Indeed they believe the reduced-form 
approach has a better predictive power as well as a better forecasting ability. 
Bharath and Shumway (2005) showed that the reduced-form approach has a better 
predictive power in the U.S. corporate defaults. In particular, they examined the 
accuracy of default forecasting and how realistic its assumptions are. In order to 
exceed the limits of Merton’s, they suggested a model with a näive alternative, with 
better predictive power (as they stated). They concluded saying that the Merton DD 
probability has some predictive power; however they asserted that “[…] most of the 
marginal benefit comes from its functional form rather than from the solution of the 
Merton model ”. 10
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) described the KMV model as an implementation of the 
Vasicek-Kealhofer model and pointed out the effectiveness of KMV models in dealing 
with credit default (after making some modifications on the assumptions). 
Black and Cox (1976) modeled the default point as an absorbing barrier and support 
the reduced-form models. 
Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) said that the Merton DD ratio has a “significant 
predictive power”. 
Duan (1994) proposed another method of estimating asset value and asset volatility, 
based on maximum likelihood estimation using equity prices. 
In 2004, the new Basel Capital Accord also recommended the IRB (Internal Rating 
Based Approach) to control credit risk. 
"
It is clear that there is a lot of uncertainty to which is the best model for estimating 
credit risk; however it is important to realize that the need to have this kind of 
!19
 J. Hilsher, R. A. Jarrow, D.R. van Deventer, Measuring the Risk: A Modern Approach, July-August 9
2008, The RMA Journal.
 S. T. Bharath, T. Shumway, Forecasting Default with the Merton Distance to Default Model, Oxford 10
Journals, May 2008.
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instruments, in order to measure manage and narrow credit risk, is becoming crucial in 
the financial markets. 
"
"
 1.3    Merton Model 
"
  1.3.1    The theoretical framework 
"
The Merton model is an extension of Black & Scholes model (1973) on option pricing 
theory. It is a structural model and it looks at the evolution of the capital structure of 
the firm to evaluate its credit risk. 
Merton gives a powerful intuition about corporate default and helps understand which 
factors affect the default probability. Moreover he provides important understanding in 
the valuation of equity and debt, when the probability of default is not trivial to 
calculate. 
This approach requires perfect observability of the balance sheets (asset value and debt 
value in particular), however the last financial crisis showed that balance sheets are 
terribly opaque and not all data are publicly available. 
"
"
  1.3.2    Assumptions 
"
The model’s assumptions are: 
"
   frictionless market  
there are no transaction costs, no taxes, no bankruptcy costs, continuos time trading, 
unrestricted borrowing and lending at a constant interest risk-free rate, complete 
information, infinite divisibility of assets, short-selling is allowed; 
"
!20
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   market perfection  
operators are price takers, agents prefer more wealth to less wealth, perfectly 
competitive market; 
"
   debt 
the model does not distinguish between different types of debts, it supposes the firm 
has just one zero coupon debt issue D, with face value  F, maturing in T periods. The 11
firm agrees/settles to pay the bond to the bondholder at maturity.  
It is clear that this is a critical assumption: here the default can occur only at the 
maturity of the bond.  
"
   capital structure 
the balance sheet of the company is in a particularly simple form and it looks like: 
(source: Moody’s ) 
"
From the accounting identity we have: 
!                                                   (1) 
where V is the firm’s total asset value, E is the equity (pays no dividend) and D is the 
market value of debt . 12
"
Table 2: Merton’s balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
firm value: V(T) debt: D(V,T)
equity: E(V,T)
total V(T) V(T)
V(T)= E(V,T)+D(V,T)
!21
 “Face value is commonly referred to the amount paid to a bondholder at the maturity date, given the 11
issuer does not default”, Investopedia.
 The market value of the debt is the price at which buyers and sellers negoziate debt-purchase 12
agreements. Estimating the market value of debt is not simple since very few firms have all their debt 
in the form of bonds. One way to estimate it is by converting this debt into a hypothetical coupon bond 
with face value F.
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The intuition is simple and straightforward: the value V(T) of a company is seen as the 
market value of all assets (tangible and intangible). Assets are purchased with the 
money of shareholders through the capitalization of the equity E or through the debt D 
(in other words, the firm is financed with debt and equity, all debt expires at time T, 
the debt is fixed and the future asset value V(T) is uncertain). Firm's assets are first 
used to pay debtholders and, whatever is left, it is distributed to shareholders. 
"
   dynamic on V(T)  
For simplicity, this method considers V as a stochastic process, in particular it assumes 
V is log normally distributed with constant volatility.  
The model assumes that V(T) follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) . That 13
means: 
!                                                (2) 
where ! is the instantaneous constant expected rate of return, ! is the constant 
volatility of the asset’s return on the underlying asset (it is assumed to be constant) and
! is a Wiener process. 
"
Parameters relevant to the model are: 
"
V is the market value of the assets of a company which is the present value of all 
future cash flows produced by the company; 
F is the amount of the liabilities of a company based on the value at which they are 
recorded in the financial statements; in practice it is the amount that the firm is 
required to pay its creditors; 
! is the asset risk, the results in the return volatility of the market value of the 
assets; it measures the level of uncertainty. 
dVT
VT
= µV dT +σV dWT
µV σV
WT
σV
!22
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 This assumption is very important, since it implies that the instantaneous log returns are normally 13
distributed with constant variance      and they are independent. The GBM model is a reasonable 
model of stock price movements.
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It is easy to see how the variables listed above actually enclose all the elements 
necessary for the determination of the probability of default of a company: V includes 
the future expansion and evolution of a company as well as the economic sector to 
which it belongs; ! (the ratio between the total liabilities and the total asset) 
expresses the financial risk; eventually, the degree of business risk of the company is 
implicitly considered in ! . 
Among these three variables, only F is known. V and ! are not directly observable. 
"
Under these assumptions, default happens when asset value is below the face value of 
the debt F: default is not allowed before maturity time. 
"
"
  1.3.3    Basic idea of Merton 
"
The basic idea of Merton is about the option nature of the equity: the model considers 
the firm’s equity as a call option on its assets. Conceptually, we have a firm that is 
continuously borrowing and retiring debt and we have two types of agents: 
equityholders (those holding shares of the firm’s equity) and debtholders (those 
owning bonds); generally, equityholders has the right to receive a portion of the firm’s 
profit in the form of dividends and may have the control of the firm; debtholders have 
the right to receive principal and interest on the debt and, in the event of bankruptcy, 
they have the priority over equityholders in the liquidation of assets. Bondholders 
could be viewed as holding a short put position on the firm’s assets. On the other hand 
equityholders can be seen as holding a call option on the asset value of the firm. At 
maturity time T, when the debt matures, debtholders are repaid the face value F of 
their bonds. 
At this point, there are two possibilities: the value of assets exceeds the value of the 
debt or not. In other words, if V(T)>F, then debtholders receive F and shareholders 
F
V
σV
σV
!23
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receive the residual value V(T)-F=S(T) and there is no default. Otherwise, if V(T)<F, 
then the firm cannot meet its financial obligations and shareholders hand over control 
to the bondholders, who liquidate the firm. So, default occurs, debtholders only 
receive the value of assets V(T) and equityholders have 0. For that reason, at time T, 
debtholders have the right to receive min(F, V(T)), whereas equityholders have 
max(V(T)-F;0): that is the payoff of a call option on V with strike price F. 
This is the intuition behind the model: the value of equity is equivalent to a European 
call option on the underlying asset value V with strike price F maturing at T. 
"
The payoff of a European call option with these characteristics is shown in the figure 
below: 
The result of the Merton model is summed up in the following equation, according 
with the option pricing theory: 
!                                            (3) 
where 
!                                              (4) 
!                                                     (5) 
E0 =V0N(d1 )- Fe
-rT N(d2 )
d
1
=
lnV0
F
+ r+
σ
V
2
2
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
T
σ
V
T
d2 = d1 -σV T
!24
M
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 E
Face value of debt F
0 10 20 30
equity holder’s payoff
1.   Merton Model
and ! is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and r is the risk-free 
rate. 
The formula (3) holds for every successive time t<T. 
"
Thereby, bearing in mind that the price of an option is a function of five variables 
(exercise price, the market value of the underlying asset, time to maturity, interest rate, 
volatility of the underlying asset), it can be set the following relation: 
!  
It expresses the value of a firm’s equity as a function of the value of the firm. 
Further, by Ito’s lemma, the stochastic differential equation defining the dynamic of E 
is given as: 
!                                              (6) 
Since V follows a GBM, we can subsisted the following expression in (6): 
!  
and obtain: 
!  
We then have the following terms: 
"
!  
By comparing them: 
"
N( ⋅ )
E = f  (V, F, σV , T, r)
dE= EdV +EdT + 1
2
E dV( )2
dV( )2 =σVV 2dT
dE= EdV +EdT + 1
2
EσVV 2dT =
= EV( µV dT +V dWT )+EdT +
1
2
EσVV 2dT
= 1
2
EsVV 2 +E+EVmV
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ dT + sV EV( )dWT
dE= µEEdT +σ EEdW
dE = 12 EσVV
2 + E + EVµV⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ dT + σVEV( )dWT
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
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!  
The volatility of the firms asset value !  is then related to the volatility of the firm’s 
equity !  as shown below: 
!                                                        (7) 
Under the B&S formula it can be shown that ! is the equity delta of a call: 
!  
We can now write down the theoretical link between the volatility of the market value 
of the equity (which in turn can be represented by the volatility of the stock price ! ) 
and the volatility of the firm: 
!                                                  (7-bis) 
"
In most application of B&S, strike price (F), time-to-maturity (T), underlying asset 
price (V), risk-free rate (r) are easily observable and only volatility ( ! ) need to be 
estimated. In Merton, conversely, the value of the underlying asset (V) is not 
observable whereas the value of an option is observed as being the total value of the 
firm’s equity (E). Therefore !  can be estimated but !  must be inferred. 
"
From the above results, a system of two nonlinear equations must be solved: 
!                                                (8) 
All the variables are known (E, F, r, T are observable, !  is estimated). 
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However, as we have already said, the firm value V is not observable, which makes 
assigning values to it and its volatility ! problematic. 
"
Before calculating the probability of default of a firm, once V and !  are inferred by 
solving the system,  the distance to default is defined as: 
!                                               (9) 
The distance to default (from now on DD) is the amount of standard deviations the 
asset value is far from default. The term µ that appears in the formula given above is 
the drift rate. Drift estimation is quite difficult (see next paragraph for more details).  
"
"
 1.3.4    Calculation of Distance to Default measure 
"
The distance to default is expressed as the number of standard deviations the firm’s 
asset value has to drop before default occurs. The large the number of standard 
deviations, the smaller is the default probability of a company. 
Statistically it can be interpreted as by how many standard deviations move in the 
asset’s value will the firm default. 
The DD formula (assuming a lognormal distribution for V) is as defined in (9). 
"
Let’s explain the formula: 
the numerator is giving an expected continuous return above the threshold by 
combining two pieces: 
!  is the implied return already in the capital structure (can be seen as the 
distance to default at present time); it is the actual continuously compounded return 
on the assets that is necessary to lead to default; 
σV
σV
DD=
lnV0
F
+ µ - 1
2
σV2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟T
σV T
ln V0 F( )
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the expected (geometric) return (the expected growth), µ, is the expected value of 
the continuously compounded return (usually positive);  
!  is the expected return over the whole period covered by the data 
measured with continuos compounding (or daily compounding, which is almost the 
same). 
The numerator is the “surprise” or the unexpected component of the rate of return 
necessary for default. 
The denominator is the volatility, the standard deviation of the rate of return. 
We divide the numerator by the denominator just to standardize, to convert the DD 
ratio into normal standard units. 
"
Once DD is calculated, we need to estimate the default probability (PD). 
The probability of default is the probability that the asset value will be lower than the 
default point . In other words, 14
!                                    (10) 
The value of the firm’s asset value can be expressed as (since V follows a GBM): 
!                                     (11) 
with µ the expected return on firm’s asset and  the random component of the firm’s 15
return. 
Crosbie and Bohn, by combining the equation (10) e (11), obtain: 
!  
"
"
µ -σV
2
2
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 From now on, the default point (DP)is identified as the face value of the debt F.14
 As in B&S assumptions, epsilon is normal distributed with an expected return equal to zero and a 15
variance equal to one.
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"
!    
!  is normally distributed with mean zero ad variance equals to 1, so that we can 
express the probability of default in terms of the cumulative normal distribution: 
!                             (12) 
The probability (under the P-measure ) that a European call option at maturity is out 16
of the money is then given by the formula just described above. We therefore need to 
estimate µ (this is not an easy task). 
Smithson  says: “Credit manager does not make any assumptions about asset growth. 17
As we will see, this approach calibrates the default and migration threshold to the 
default and migration probabilities; so, the rate of growth is irrelevant”. 
Crouhy, Galai and Mark  define µ as the expected return on assets, net of out cash 18
flows. 
Hurd  suggests that “one possibility is to use a unique µ per sector or industry (which 19
would be easier to estimate)”. 
Duffie et al. (2007), Vassalou and Xing (2004), Crosbie and Bohn (2003), Harada and 
Ito (2008) estimate µ and use the value in the calculation of the DD.  
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 P is the actual/real world probability, the historical or physical probability measure. When we try to 16
make a prediction, we use P.
 C. W. Smithson, Credit Portfolio Management, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003, pag. 162.17
 M. Crouhy, D. Galai and R. Mark, Risk Management, McGraw-Hill, 2001, pag. 364.18
 M. R. Grasselli and T. R. Hurd, Credit Risk Modeling, Dep. of Mathematics and Statistics, 19
Hamilton, Toronto, January 3, 2012, pag.69.
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Gropp. Vesala and Vulpes (2006), Nakashima and Soma (2008) use the risk free rate r 
instead of µ. This methodology obviously needs less data but it amounts to computing 
the risk neutral DD. 
"
Regarding equity as a call option, present value pricing of the derivative  instrument 
justifies the use of risk free rate. But !  is not pricing, it is future 
distribution estimation, requiring “real world” asset drift: this justifies the using of µ in 
the formula. The formula (12) gives us the risk neutral default probability (under the 
P-measure). 
Therefore, the probability (under the Q-measure ) that a European call at maturity is 20
out of the money is obtained by replacing the drift µ with r and is given by: 
!                            (13) 
Empirically !  that means that the true physical default probability ( ! ) is lower 
than the risk neutral probability ( ! ). 
So the Gropp. Vesala and Vulpes approach overestimates PD. 
"
In the picture below, it is possible understand better this risk measure: 
PD= N(-DD)
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ln V0
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+ r -σV
2
2
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 Q is the risk neutral probability. It is used only for pricing. 20
Generally speaking, we use P to calculate default, we use Q for pricing.
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!  
(source: Crosbie and Bohn, 2007) 
"
In the red circle, we simply ask: what’s the probability we could end up here, in this 
tail?  This is the EDF, the expected default probability (see paragraph 2.4.4). 
If V follows a normal distribution (as we assume), as a consequence the cumulative 
distribution is a function that tells that the probability of ending up in this tail is DD 
standard deviations. It’s then just a statistic. 
"
However, in reality, the distribution of assets return is leptokurtic and the actual tail 
may be fatter than that one that appears in the figure. By assuming the log normality of 
V (this hypothesis is crucial for calculating DD), the Merton model under predicts 
default by a large margin. More details in the paragraph . 
"
"
  1.3.5    Limits of Merton’s model 
"
V and !  are not even directly observable; 
default occurs only at maturity T and not before, that means default is never a 
surprise: may happen that the firm’s value collapses to minimal levels before the 
σV
!31
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maturity of the debt “but the firm is still able to recover and meet the debt’s 
payment at the maturity ”; in other word, in reality may happen that a firm 21
defaults when V<F for the first time, not necessary at T; 
it does not apply very well when the capital structure is not simple (in reality 
capital structures are more complex); 
risk-free rate and volatility are constant (as in Black & Scholes model, these 
assumptions are questionable); 
the firm has just a single issue of zero coupon bond: that is not realistic; 
asymmetric information problem: equity prices may not efficiently incorporate all 
publicly-available information about default probability; Sloan (1996) points out 
that the market does not accurately reflect all of the information in the financial 
statements; 
the model applies only on firm listed on the stock exchange; if not, how can be 
estimated the default probability? 
it assumes all liabilities are constant: but in reality firms tend to change liabilities 
as they approach distress, then it turns out that the Merton PD will be less than the 
realized PD; 
asset return distribution is normal, whereas in reality asset return distribution is fat 
tailed; 
default point is assumed to be constant, fixed at the the face value of the debt F. 
In practice, the default point is a random variable. As a firm approach default, it 
tends to adjust its liabilities. 
"
"
  1.3.6    Beyond the Merton model 
"
The strength of the Merton model is that it relies on the stock price, that maybe it is the 
best market data for a company. 
!32
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“The Merton DD model is a clever application of classic finance theory, but how well 
it performs in forecasting depends on how realistic its assumptions are ”.  22
Moreover “ […] if the assumptions of Merton model really hold, the Merton DD 
model should give very accurate default forecast”. 
Empirical studies have demonstrated that this approach under predicts defaults by a 
large margin. In particular, the hypothesis on the normality of asset returns does not 
reflect what happens in reality, where the value distribution is fat-tailed and extreme 
events are far more likely, as highlighted in the main drawbacks of the model 
(paragraph 1.3.5). 
Given that, it would be reasonable to ask whether the Merton model is far from 
realistic. 
It is clear that the model requires strong assumptions on the dynamics of the firm’s 
asset, its debt and how its capital is structured, but at the same time its background, 
even if quite stylized, it is enough to understand the effects of the credit risk on a 
firm’s governance. 
The model also help understand which factors affect the default probability. Simply, 
Merton asserts that the probability of default can be obtained directly applying the 
cumulative normal distribution transformation of -DD, or PD=N(-DD) with an 
important assumption: normal distribution of asset returns. However, as already 
mentioned, in reality this assumption is almost never fulfilled and therefore it could 
lead to biased estimates. 
For example, to make it clear, a research  from Moody’s has showed how firms with 23
DD=4 are predicted to have default rate of 0,003% under the normal distribution 
assumption. Empirically, firms with DD = 4 are found to have default rate of 0,6%: it 
is 200 times than predicted by normality assumption. 
"
!33
 S. T. Bharath and T. Shumway, Forecasting Default with the Merton Distance to Default Model, The 22
Review of Financial Studies, 2008.
 Moody’s EDF™ 8.0 Model Enhancements, January 29, 2007, Moody’s KMV. 23
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In order to overcome these limitations, other models have been developed and 
practical implementations of the Merton model are today used by financial institutions.  
Beyond question we can say that Merton has given the structural framework on which 
two of the most important credit risk models are now based: Moody’s-KMV model 
and Credit Risk Models (CreditMetrics). Credit Ratings agencies use the Merton 
model for assessing the default probability and Moody’s manage some of the above 
drawbacks by empirical modifications, relying upon a very large proprietary database 
(that improves the default prediction). 
Let’s see now in details the structural KMV model. 
"
"
!34
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2.    MKMV Model 
"
"
 2.1    General background 
"
The implementation of the Merton model has received considerable commercial 
attention in  the recent years. 
In the late 1980s, the Merton model was revisited by Kealhofer and Vasicek. They 
extended the Black & Scholes framework to produce a default forecasting model, first 
known as Vasicek-Kealhofer (VK) model, later named Moody’s KMV by the three 
company founder Kealhofer, McQuow and Vasicek (when the KMV model was 
acquired in 2002 by Moody’s, one of the major rating agencies, for $210 million). 
Today we refer to it as Moody’s KMV or MKMV model (hereafter MKMV model). 
Currently MKMV is the most popular commercial model for assessing credit risk 
( Table 1). 
Over the years, KMV Corporation has developed a credit risk methodology, as well as 
an extensive database  (the most relevant contribution of this model is the 24
construction of an extensive database that shows the relationship between DD and 
EDF, the expected default frequency). 
In the MKMV approach, each company is analyzed individually without using the 
rating class. Indeed, MKMV has criticized the use of such methods (i.e. CreditMetrics) 
underlying the fact that rating are not updated so often, whereas default probabilities 
changes continuously (they empirically showed that some bonds rated BBB and AA 
may in fact have the same probability of default ). 25
!35
 The database includes over 250.000 company years data and over 4.700 incidents of default or 24
bankruptcy.
 “A firm with a BBB rating could have an EDF that was also in the AAA range, or in the B range! 25
This is an astonishing amount of confusion. Could this possibly be the case? And, if so,how?”, Uses 
and Abuses of Default Rates, KMV corporation, 1998, page 13.
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As said above, this model is a proprietary model and therefore not all information is 
publicly available. Only the MKMV’s customers have full access to the database. 
Bharath and Shumway said: “it would be great to have MKMV data to perform similar 
test, for us is too expensive ”.  26
In order to overcome this problem (the lack of information), in this thesis, the 
hypothesis of normal distribution of assets return is assumed. 
Similar to the Merton model, a default event happens when the value of assets falls 
below a certain value (the default threshold).  However, the default in MKMV’s is not 
the same as in Merton’s: default is allowed at any time !  if the asset value V 
crosses the barrier DP. In addition, the former considers a firm’s capital structure more 
complex than the latter and it estimates more deeply the default threshold on the basis 
of all liabilities. 
Under these assumptions, the value of the firm’s assets is assumed to be log normally 
distributed, i.e. the log returns on the assets are normally distributed. 
"
Deserve some consideration issues regarding the following questions: 
why new models have been developed? what is the contribution of MKMV? how does 
the MKMV model improve the Merton model? 
By highlighting the Merton’s limitations, we emphasized that its assumptions are 
unrealistic. MKMV solves some of these limitations. 
Firstly, whereas in Merton the default point was constant and equal to F (the face 
value redeemed at maturity), in MKMV the default point is determined empirically 
(therefore DP is a variable and it is not constant). Since firms adjust their liabilities, 
the closer they are to default, the more DP varies. 
Secondly, MKMV does not use a normal distribution of assets. Instead, it assumes a 
proprietary algorithm based on historical default rates. In other words, it implements 
the Merton model using a proprietary database. 
t <T
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The success of the MKMV approach than other credit risk models is mainly due to two 
reasons: 
1. Moody's has a very large database of historical DD (having a large database is 
crucial, since the empirical measures are reliable only in the presence of large 
sample); 
2. it uses market data for the estimation of PD, according to its large database, 
obtaining  better results than Merton’s. 
"
In order to get it clear, let’s make an example: to extend to default, default rates change 
continuously with current economic and financial conditions, while rating are adjusted 
in a discrete fashion; firms within the same rating class have the same default rate and 
last but not least default is only defined in a statistical sense without explicit reference 
to the process which leads to default (MKMV proposed a model which relates default 
to the balance sheet dynamics). 
However, as we have already stated, since it is a proprietary model, not all information 
is available publicly. Analysts consider this model a “black box” because no one, 
expect whose work there, can’t access the database. 
"
"
 2.2    MKMV model assumptions 
"
   debt 
it is supposed to be homogeneous with time of maturity T; 
   market perfection  
same conditions as assumed in the Merton approach; 
   dynamic of V 
V is the asset value of a firm. There can be little doubt that the asset value coincides 
with the book value of a firm. This is not the case. The market asset value is a good 
!37
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measure to describe “the firm’s ongoing business”  and varies as market participants 27
change the balance sheets and the firm’s prospects. It is more like the value that the 
firm can be sold. In addition, the distribution of asset returns is stable over time and 
the volatility of asset returns ( ! ) remains relatively constant.  
As in Merton, the model assumes that V follows a Geometric Brownian Motion. That 
means: 
!  
with ! constant drift rate, !  and !  Wiener process.  
 
Given this, log asset returns follows a Normal distribution function with mean and 
variance described as follows: 
!                                   (14) 
!                                                (15) 
where: 
! = mean rate of return on the assets !  
! = asset volatility 
   liabilities  
the model considers short-term liabilities, long-term liabilities, convertible debt, 
common equity and preferred equity; 
   the volatility of asset returns  
the volatility of asset returns remains relatively constant; 
   capital structure of the firm  
the capital structure is relatively simple: a firm derives value from the cash flows it is 
expected to generate (from the assets), liabilities are paid first (however claims are 
σV
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 “The market value is different from the book value. Financial models uses market value of assets 27
because is a good measure of the value of firm’s ongoing business and it changes as market 
participants revise the firm’s future prospects”, M. Crouhy, D. Galai, R. Mark.
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limited to principal and interest) and equity is paid second, but it has unlimited claims 
on the cash flow. 
"
"
 2.3    Characteristics of MKMV model 
"
dynamics of EDF comes mostly from the dynamics of the equity values; 
distance to default ratio determines the level of default risk; 
ability to adjust to the credit cycle and ability to quickly reflect any deterioration/
change in credit quality; 
it works best in highly efficient liquid market conditions; 
this pricing model is based upon the risk neutral valuation model then the 
expectation is calculated using the risk neutral probabilities and not the actual 
probabilities. Under the risk-neutral probabilities, the expected instantaneous return 
on all securities is the risk-free rate r, for any horizon T. 
"
"
 2.4    Main steps 
"
The model identifies four main steps and they are the following: 
"
1. identification of the default point 
2. estimation of V and !  
3. calculation of DD 
4. use of Moody’s database to identify the expected default frequency (EDF) 
"
  2.4.1    Identification of the default point 
"
The default point is set equal to short-term liabilities plus half of long-term liabilities. 
σV
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Using a sample of hundreds companies, Moody’s empirically found that firms 
generally default when V reaches a level somewhere between short-term liabilities and 
long-term liabilities or in other word a firm survives when the value of assets is less 
than the liabilities that cannot be repaid in the short-term. Thus, they set the default 
point as short-term liabilities plus half of long-term liabilities (it is a good 
approximation), calculated on the basis of short-term liabilities, long-term liabilities, 
convertible debt, common equity and preferred equity. Given this information: 
DP=STD + 0.5LTD                                                   (16) 28
where   STD = short term liabilities 
LTD = long term liabilities 
"
In Merton, we have seen that default event happens when the value of firm’s asset is 
below the default point (V<DP). The key insight of MKMV’s contribution is the fact 
that it is possibile not to have default even if the value of the assets has fallen to less 
than the total debt. This is natural: generally the current cash (short-term debt) causes 
default (the firm may have not enough cash to keep paying all liabilities as they come 
due though the total liabilities may be greater than the total assets). Therefore, default 
occurs when V reaches some value between short-term and long-term debt liabilities. 
Vassalou & Xing (2004) argue that “the interest payments of the long-term debt are 
parts of short-term liability. In addition, the size of the long-term debt affects the firm’s 
ability to roll over its short-term debt, and therefore reduce the default risk.” 
"
  2.4.2    Estimation of asset value and volatility of asset 
"
If all liabilities were listed and marked to market daily, then the estimation of the asset 
value of the company would be very simple, it may be inferred by simply adding the 
!40
 This is purely empirical, does not rest on any theoretical foundation. The total debt is inadequate 28
when not all of it is due to one year, as the firm may remain solvent even when the asset value of 
assets falls below its total liabilities. On the other side, using only the short-term debt would be wrong 
because, for example, there are covenants that force the firm to serve other debts when its financial 
situation deteriorates.
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value of total equity E with the value of total debts D.  On the other side, the volatility 
of asset would be easy to calculate as well; in fact it would be sufficient to estimate the 
volatility of return’s rates from the time series of asset values. 
However, in practice, not all debt is traded, as corporate bonds, only E is marked to 
market daily and hence we cannot directly observe V. 
By assuming a relatively simple capital structure, composed of equity, short-term debt, 
long-term debt and convertible preferred shares , MKMV tries to infer V taking as 29
starting point the option pricing formula of B&S, following the identical approach of 
Merton. 
We have already said that the probability that a firm will be default is a function of two 
elements: the firm’s asset value (V) and the volatility of asset returns ( ! ). 
The equity is treated as a call option written on V, exercise price is equal to the 
nominal amount of debt F and the expiry time is T. 
In this way it is possible to express the value of equity as a function  of the assets and 30
its volatility: 
!  
where F is set as the default point. 
Similarly, it is also possible to define the link between equity volatility ( ! ) and the 
volatility of asset returns ( ! ): 
!  
!  is then a function of the firm’s asset value, the asset’s volatility, the default point, 
the risk-free interest rate r and T. 
This relationship “holds only instantaneously. In practice the market leverage moves 
around far too much for that equation to provide reasonable results. Worse yet, the 
σV
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!41
 Vasicek (1997), Crouhy and Galai (1994) have extended the study to more complex capital 29
structure.
 Since we assume T=1, we write the system in a simplified form omitting T.30
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model biases the probabilities in precisely the wrong direction. Default probabilities 
calculated in this manner provide little discriminatory power  ”. 31
On this basis, all these consideration are reflected in the following system of two 
equations in two unknowns that we have already had the chance to introduce earlier: 
!  
Solving simultaneously the system is not an easy task since the solution is not 
straightforward ( and depend on and ). 32
The MKMV method is to solve iteratively for ! . They start with an initial ! (a first 
guess) equals to ! , then they solve the first equation for V given E, using 
their first guess of ! . Then, V is introduced in the asset volatility relationship (the 
second equation of the system), to infer ! , with ! computed from historical equity 
returns. Finally, ! is then reintroduced in the first equation and so on, until !  
converges. Thus E and ! are used jointly to back out V and ! . 
"
These two unknown parameters, V and ! , are influenced by many factors. 
Also Crosbie and Bohn (2003) observed that ! (asset volatility) is related to the size 
and the nature of the firm’s business. They proved that industries with low ! tend to 
have large DP, industries with high ! tend to have small DP.  
Once V and ! are inferred, it is possible to discover the safety margin that separates a 
company from its failure threshold, which is the Distance to Default ratio. 
"
"
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 Remember the expressions (4) and (5).32
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  2.4.3    Calculation of Distance-to-Default measure 
"
In order to avoid complexity due to µ estimation, MKMV works on its large 
proprietary database and uses an alternative formula to calculate DD: 
!                                                      (17) 
where ! is the expected future asset value and (V-DP) is the so called net market 
worth. 
The DD  is the distance between the future asset value in T years and the default 33
point; it is expressed in standard deviations of future asset returns. When the distance 
to default decreases, the company becomes more likely to default. 
"
In outline, MKMV applies the Merton model, but abandons the PD=N(-DD) in favor 
of PD=historical default rate. Since DD is empirical, having a database of 
considerable size is highly appreciable. 
"
    2.4.3.1    General considerations on DD 
"
It is now time to make some important observations about this new quantity. 
First it is immediate to conclude that the distance to default of a company is greater the 
lower the volatility of the return on assets and the greater the difference between the 
asset value and the default point. 
This measure is nothing but than a ratio, increasing in V, decreasing in DP and 
increasing in ! . Moreover, the longer the maturity the smaller the DD, the higher the 
volatility the smaller the DD. 
Different levels of liabilities correspond to different business risk, hence to different 
default probabilities. 
DDKMV =
VT - DPT
VTσV
VT
σV
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Moody’s: “the difference in their default probabilities is thus driven by the difference 
in the risks of their business, not their respective asset values or leverages”. 
Secondly, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of having divided the numerator 
(the market net worth) for the volatility changes ( ! ). The net market value, by 
itself, does not constitute a valid indicator of the risk of insolvency as it does not take 
into account the effects (in terms of risk) related to factors such as size, sector, 
industries and geographical location of the company that are rather well reflected in 
the asset volatility. 
Then, as we said before, the distance to default represent a universal measure of risk of 
default able to make homogeneous (and thus comparable to each other) companies 
with very different characteristics (which may belong to different countries, different 
industries, sizes, etc.). 
“The DD measure combines three key credit issues: V, its business and industry risk 
and its leverage. Moreover, the DD also incorporates, via the asset value and 
volatility, the effects of industry, geography and firm size ”. 34
In short, DD is a measure of company’s financial situation: as DD increases , the 
company becomes less likely to default; conversely, as DD decreases, the company 
becomes more likely to default. 
"
However DD has two major limitations:  
1) computationally it is not trivial; a solution to this problem would be to use a naïve 
DD measure, as in Bharath and Shumway (2008), which is much easier to 
calculate and “ensures, at the same time, equivalent results in terms of default 
prediction accuracy ”; 35
2) it is possible to calculate the DD only for publicly traded firms (balance sheet data 
are available with flags and on a quarterly basis only, whereas securities prices are 
available on a real time basis). 
V ⋅σV
!44
 Moody’s KMV Corporation.34
 G. Bottazzi, M. Grazzi, A. Secchi, F. Tamagni, Financial and Economic Determinants of Firm 35
Default, Springer, February 2011.
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When applied to bank, since banks are more leveraged than a non financial 
corporation, distance to default is lower, so that a bank would have a higher risk score 
than a non financial firm.  36
Harada, Ito, Takahaski  examined the DDs of 8 failed Japanese banks, during the 37
period 1995-2003. They found that “the DD was generally a reliable measure in 
predicting bank failure” even if for some banks it has not any predictive power. They 
justify that position saying “those results were partly due to lack of transparency in 
financial statements and disclosed information”. 
"
Nowadays much of the debate is about the DD real predictive power for insolvency. 
This measure “is highly informative about default, but it must be used along with other 
variables to achieve good performance” . Duan (2012) showed that, in addition to 38
DD, there are other variables significantly contributing to default prediction. 
"
"
  2.4.4    Calculation of the Expected Default Frequency 
"
At this point, once DDs are calculated, MKMV divides by classes of DDs and 
compute the expected default frequency (EDF), which is given by the historical 
frequency of default of firms belonging to the same class of DD. In a nutshell, DD is a 
necessary input for the final step of the Credit Monitor Model  by Moody’s: estimate 39
the probability of failure, the probability that the value of assets will be less than the 
value of the debt at the forecast horizon. Log normality assumption of asset return is 
!45
 J. A. Chan-Lau, A. N. R. Sy, Distance-to-Default in Banking: A Bridge Too Far?, International 36
Monetary Found, WP/06/215, 2006.
 K. Harada, T. Ito, S. Takahashi, Is the Distance to Default a Good Measure in Predicting Bank 37
Failure? Case Studies, Working paper 16182, http://www.nber.org/papers/w16182, National Bureau 
od Economic Research, July 2010.
 Jin-Chin Duan, Measuring Distance-to-Default for Financial and Non-Financial Firms, Global 38
Credit Review Vol.2, July 2012.
 The new standard evaluation for the quantitative measurement of default risk developed by 39
Moody’s.
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abandoned (do not forget however log normality is a crucial hypothesis in the 
estimation of DD and PD). 
This new index EDF  is developed internally and it has been proven to be a powerful 40
and forward-looking indicator of corporate default. MKMV transforms DD in EDF in 
order to get an absolute probability of default. It is then a statistical method to quantify 
the probability that, given certain characteristics of a company, the fluctuation of its 
asset values falls below the total debt of the firm, identified as the default point. 
“EDF is an absolute measure of default risk […] It is the probability that a firm will 
default within a given time horizon by failing to make an interest or principal 
payment ”. 41
Moody’s states that EDF has great predictive abilities in reporting the deterioration of 
credit conditions (however it might be a biased opinion, it is their version of the story). 
The KMV-Credit Monitor Model is able to provide for each listed company, a default 
probability defined on the basis of individual parameters, in contrast to what happens 
with ratings, where a firm is classified for rating quality. 
Using a large database of failures  and combining market data with historical data, 42
MKMV has created a correspondence between the class of DD and the relative 
frequency of failures that characterizes each class (they generated a frequency table by 
mapping the DD to the actual default frequency). In this way, combining market asset 
value, asset volatility and the default point term structure, they calculate a DD term 
structure and EDFs are derived from an empirical mapping of DDs to historical default 
rates. In other words, taken the firms with a given DD and taken the number of firms 
that actually defaulted within one year, the proportion between them 
is the EDF. Thus the model proceeds to estimate the probability of default using the 
“frequency table” estimated empirically using their proprietary default database. 
!46
 EDF is a trademark and property of KMV and it plays a crucial role in the MKMV’s approach.40
 Moody’s EDF™ 8.0 Model Enhancements, Moody’s KMV, January 29, 2007.41
 The sample in question includes more than 100.000 companies listed on the US market, 42
approximately 3.400 of them defaulted, that have been monitored since 1973 (lately firms belonging 
to different continents from the US have been considered in an attempt to make the database as 
universal as possible).
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(source: Estrella ) 43
"
At this point, it can be easily understood that in order to determine the probability of 
default (knowing the DDs), the EDF value (associated to firms with the same DD and 
the same T)  must be inferred in the frequency table. 
Let’s make an example: suppose we have 35.000 firms with the same DD=4 and 
suppose that 150 firms default one year later. 
Then, the EDF would be:  
! !  
"
This means that any firms with DD close to 4 will be assigned an EDF of 0,43%. 
Essentially, the figure below shows a relationship between DD and EDF (even if a 
functional relationship between EDF e DD has not yet been postulated). Moreover, 
MKMV’s empirical research indicates that this relationship remains constant even 
with varying size, time and place in which the company operates; therefore, two 
companies with identical DD will have identical EDF even if they have different 
business sizes and are located in different regions . 44
Table 3
DD EDF details
1 800bp 9.000 firms/720 defaulted
2 300bp 15.000 firms/450 defaulted
3 100bp 30.000 firms/200 defaulted
4 43bp 35.000 firms/150 defaulted
5 7bp 40.000 firms/20 defaulted
6 4bp 42.000 firms/17 defaulted
EDF = number of  firms defaulted
number of  firms in the sample with the same DD
= 150
35.000
= 0,43%
!47
 A. Estrella, Credit Ratings and Complementary Sources of Credit Quality Information, Basel 43
Committee on Banking SupervisionWorking Papers, No. 3, August 2000.
 All these variables do affect default risk and are already considered when calculating DD.44
2.   MKMV Model
It should clearly visualize that as DD decreases, EDF increases. Thereby, there is a 
negative relationship between the two indicators. 
"
!  
(source: Estrella) 
"
EDFs are affected by several factors: 
- the stock price V 
- the default point DP 
- the asset volatility !  
- the leverage ratio !  
- µ, the expected rate of growth 
- T, the length of the horizon 
In particular, as stock price decreases, debt increases, asset volatility increases and 
business  are more risky , the EDF increases. 45
If ! goes up, EDF goes up; if DD goes up, EDF goes down. 
"
σV
DP
V
DP
V
!48
 Business is more risky when the asset volatility increases. According to Crosbie and Bohn (2003), 45
the business risk is measured by the standard deviation of assets which varies between industries and 
across countries. 
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    2.4.4.1    EDF vs. agency rating 
"
At this point, it would be useful examine two of the worst corporate accounting 
scandals  of all time: Enron  and WorldCom , which clearly show how EDF 46 47 48
provides earlier warning power than competitors. 
Enron’s picture below: 
!
WorldCom’s picture: 
!  
!49
 http://www.accounting-degree.org/scandals/46
 Enron was a service and energy corporation that defaulted on the 2nd of December, 2001. Until the 47
WorldCom bankruptcy, Enron was the biggest corporate bankruptcy ever in the U.S.
 WorldCom was a telecommunication company that declares bankruptcy on the 21st of July, 2002.48
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On December 2001 Enron Corporation declared bankruptcy. For months before 
bankruptcy, the S&P rating stays constant whereas KMV-EDF score provides early 
warning of deteriorating credit quality even eleven months before bankruptcy. 
A similar situation is described for WorldCom. It can be seen that KMV-EDF reacts 
any change faster than S&P ratings. 
From the figures given above it may generally deduce that KMV-EDF provides early 
warning power than those competitors. 
However, as mentioned before, this is Moody’s version of story. These two are only 
examples and they boast of the superiority of the EDF measure  on the traditional 49
method of rating classes (Standard&Poor’s in the above example). Bharath and 
Shumway, for example, pointed out that, when the Enron’s stock price began to 
plumed, the DD immediately decreased but agency ratings took same time before 
downgrading the rating class: in fact, should be evident that, using equity values to 
infer default probabilities, Merton model is for sure faster than than traditional ratings 
 (since it is mainly based on the data of the stock market: market capitalization and 
volatility of equity ). 50
However, they point out “before Enron’s accounting problems were well know, when 
Enron’s stock price was arguably unsustainably high, the expected default frequency 
for Enron was significantly lower than the default probability assigned to Enron by 
standard ratings”. This is because if the markets were perfectly efficient , the Merton 51
model would be preferred for the above explanations. However, in reality, this does 
not happen, then the information is not captured by stock prices and Merton model 
does not provide or at least does not guarantee any “better” prediction than that one 
offered by Moody’s or by any other rating’s agencies or credit models. 
!50
 “EDF provides early warning power and is dynamic and continuous while ratings move in discrete 49
steps. It is updated frequently”. They continue: “The EDF measure is accurate and powerful; it 
provides significant early warning”, Moody’s KMV.
 In the paragraph 1.3.6, we said “The strength of the Merton model is that it relies on the stock price, 50
that maybe it is the best market data for a company”.
 A market is efficient when prices include all relevant information.51
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Can we then assert that EDF is a good predictor of default? Surely we can say that it is 
widely used by financial institution as a predictor of default probability whereas 
Moody’s declares that EDF score is accurate and powerful as well as it has a real early 
power. 
(source: KMV corporation ) 
"
"
 2.5    Distance to Capital 
"
Make a distinction between distance to default for financial and non financial firms is 
justified by the fact that in general DDs of banks are higher than DDs of non financial 
firms because they are more leveraged. Concisely banks are intermediaries between 
depositors and borrowers, they accept deposits and lend money in order to earn a 
profit. Their activity is almost entirely based on leverage and loans are the largest 
source of credit risk. 
Table 4: EDF versus agency ratings
EDF (basic point) S&P Moody’s Meaning
2-4 ≥AA ≥Aa2 Highest quality, minimal credit risk
4-10 AA/A A1 High quality/Strong payment capacity
10-19 A/BBB+ Baa1 Adequate protection, moderate credit risk
19-40 BBB+/BBB- Baa3 Adequate protection, moderate credit risk
40-72 BBB-/BB Ba1 Likely to pay, but ongoing uncertainty
72-101 BB/BB- Ba3 Likely to pay, but ongoing uncertainty
101-143 BB-/B+ B1 Likely to pay, but ongoing uncertainty
143-202 B+/B B2 High risk
202-345 B/B- B2 High risk
!51
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However, Chan-Lau and Sy (2006)  say that the DD measure does not include any 52
complexity related to banks nor any regulatory actions. Furthermore, if to one side the 
new BSI capital requirement allows banks to use internal models to evaluate 
regulatory capital for both credit risk and market risk, on the other side it requires 
banks constraints increasingly severe. The reason behind this is that regulators have a 
strong incentive to intervene before the default event happens, in order to avoid fiscal 
costs associated to this event. 
Therefore they define a new measure of default risk, called Distance to Capital, 
asserting that “the methods used to calculate the distance to default can be easily 
extended to for calculating the distance to capital”. 
The distance to capital measure is derived from the Merton model. The framework is 
the same described in the previous paragraphs, the assumptions about the firm’s value 
(V follows a GBM) and the equity E (treated as a call option on V) still hold. The only 
significant difference is the choice of the default barrier. 
As illustrated in paragraph 1.3.3 the distance to default is expressed by the following 
formula: 
!    
where F, the face value of the debt, is set as the default point DP, equals to short-term 
liabilities and half of long-term liabilities. 
Chan-Lau and Sy (2006) say “Rather than assuming that the relevant barrier is the face 
value of the bank’s liabilities, we can choose a barrier consistent with the prevalent 
PCA  framework”. 53
Distance to Capital is defined as follow: 
DD=
ln V0
DPT
+ µ -σV
2
2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
T
σV T
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 J. A. Chan-Lau, A. N. R. Sy, Distance-to-Default in Banking: A Bridge Too Far?, International 52
Monetary Found, WP/06/215, 2006.
 PCA (prompt-corrective-actions) is a number of rules and actions which need to be used if banks are 53
not able to pay their debt on time.
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!                                              (18) 
where !  is a correction factor expressed as !  and PCAR are the 
capital adequacy thresholds from the PCA framework or as set by the supervisor. 
According to Basel Capital Accord 1, PCAR is set to 8% . 54
Then DD can be seen as a special case of DC with ! . 
"
In the IMF Working Paper cited above, two Japanese banks are examined and DDs and 
DCs are calculated for the purposes of comparison. They found that the DCs are lower 
than the DDs and “both measures exhibits high correlation”. Moreover, they found that 
the lower ! , the higher the difference between the two measures. 
"
In our study, we calculate for each firms (financial and non financial firms) the 
distance to default measure. Then we also calculate the distance to capital measure 
only for financial firms in order to understand if setting capital adequacy ratio is useful 
for measuring and managing credit risk. 
"
"
 2.6    Financial and economic factors that influence DD 
"
A study conducted by Bottazzi et al.  shows that there are several variables that 55
represent key factors that influences a company’s performance and its economic-
financial situation. 
DC=
ln V0
λDPT
+ µ -σV
2
2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
T
σV T
λ λ= 1
1- PCARi
≥ 1
λ =1
σV
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 M. Larsson, A. Magne, Predicting the Default Probability of Companies in USA and EU during the 54
financial crisis, Master Thesis, Lund University, Spring 2010.
 G. Bottazzi, M. Grazzi, A. Secchi, F. Tamagni, Financial and Economic Determinants of Firm 55
Default, Springer, February 2011.
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This study focuses on the Italian industry and has shown that there are concrete 
differences between defaulting and non defaulting firms. Their findings show that 
“economic characteristics of firms do play a relevant role, both over the longer and 
the shorter run”. 
Their aim is to identify what is the role of economic and financial factors inside a 
company and how they really affect their default risk. 
Their analysis is based on a list of default events occurring within Italian 
manufacturing in 2003-2004; their sample includes 19.628 manufacturing firms and 
147 default events. 
Results show there is a positive relationship between labour productivity and the event 
of default, a positive relationship between size and default and between growth and 
default, a negative relationship between productivity and probability of default and 
between profitability and the probability of default. 
Bottazzi and Tamagni (2010)  found that the PD increases with size. A default event 56
involves costs and consequences it is not so pleasant for a company. This would 
suggest that this event should be avoided in the beginning.  
Even if default does not necessarily imply failure, they say “default represents a good 
proxy for failure”. 
Some other factors can be significant determinant of the DDs. An OECD research , 57
on a sample of 94 US and EU banks (defaulted and not defaulted banks) over the 
period 2004-2011, shows as variables as market beta, house prices, derivatives, trading 
assets, ecc. affect the DD measure.  
Furthermore, for what concerns the difference between financial and non financial 
firms, the OECD research argued that “the Basel system is excessively complex, 
rendering it ineffective” (according with what we have stated several times in this 
discussion). 
!54
 G. Bottazzi, F. Tamagni, Is Bigger Always Better? The Effect of Size on Defaults, LEM-Scuola 56
Superiore Sant’ Anna, Pisa, Italy, May 2010.
 OECD Journal, Financial Market Trends, No.103, Business Models of Banks, Leverage and The 57
Distance-to-Default, January 2013.
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Given this information, it can be understood that there are micro and macro influences 
on default.  
"
"
 2.7    Strength 
"
changes in EDF tend to anticipate at least one year earlier than the downgrading of 
the issuer by rating agencies like Moody’s and S&P’s (in this regards see example 
about Enron and WorldCom); 
this approach provide a continuous credit monitoring process thanks to the 
information (accurate and timely information) obtained from the equity market; a 
process that would be difficult and expensive to duplicate using traditional credit 
analysis; 
DD and then EDF react quickly to changes in the economic prospects of a firm 
(whereas agencies are often slow to adjust ratings) since these ratios are based on 
equity data (i.e. E, the market capitalization and ! , the equity volatility are daily-
available) ; 58
annual reviews and other traditional credit processes cannot maintain the same 
degree of vigilance that EDFs calculated on a monthly or a daily basis can provide; 
EDF tends to reflect the current macroeconomic environment and tend to be a 
better predictor of defaults over short time horizons ; 59
the model combines market data (forward looking) with historical data (the usage 
of the empirical database improves default prediction enormously). 
"
Although empirical studies and research have been proved its effectiveness and 
warning capacity, the MKMV model has some weakness. 
σ E
!55
 Stulz: “Probabilities of default change continually rather that only when ratings change”. 58
If E increases, PD decreases, whereas in the credit metrics approach, even if the value of firm changes, 
the PD may remain the same because the firm’s rating does not change.
 Moody’s EDF™ 8.0 Model Enhancements, Moody’s KMV, January 29, 2007.59
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 2.8    Weaknesses 
"
it requires some subjective estimation of the input parameters (i.e the default 
point); 
it assumes that assets returns are normally distributed. However, in reality, the 
distribution is leptokurtic and extreme events are far more likely. Thus this method 
under predicts default by a large margin; 
it is difficult to construct theoretical EDFs without the assumption of normality of 
asset returns; 
EDFs of private firms can be calculated only by using some comparability analysis 
based on accounting data; 
MKMV model is static: once the debt is in place, the firm does not change it. 
"
This approach works better when applied to public traded companies, where the value 
of equity is determined by the stock market: the reason behind this is that the market 
information contained in the firm’s stock price and in the balance sheet is translated 
into an implied risk of default. 
"
 2.9    Merton-MKMV comparison 
"
The main differences between the two approaches are listed in the table below: 
(source: Bohn , 2006) 
"
Table 5
MERTON MODEL MKMV MODEL
two classes of liabilities: debt and equity five classes of liabilities: short-term, long-term, 
convertible debt, preferred equity, common equity
cumulative normal distribution to convert DD into 
PD
empirical distribution to assign default probabilities 
to DDs
default occurs only at T default can occur before T
the default point is equal to total debt the default point is empirically determined by its 
large database
!56
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In the Merton approach the default was allowed only at maturity. Here, in MKMV, a 
firm defaults at any time t<T if the asset value V crosses the barrier DP. Moreover, 
Merton focuses on the debt valuation whereas MKMV focuses on the research of 
EDF. 
Then, in conclusion, MKMV uses its proprietary database to map the calculated DD, 
instead of using the Z-table (as in Merton, which underestimate fat tail distributions) 
and instead of assuming one zero coupon debt, MKMV calculates the default point as 
described in (17). Other than these two points, the two models seem to be the same. It 
is definitely the same concept but different in application. 
"
"
 2.10    Final remarks on MKMV model 
"
As we have seen the model requires a number of simplified and unrealistic 
assumptions and this limits the efficiency of the model: “the ability of the model in 
predicting defaults depends on how realistic are their assumptions” . 60
Over the years, Moody’s KMV have implemented the Credit Monitor model as an 
instrument for the default prediction. EDF, the expected default frequency, represents 
the most important innovation of this model, which has become a standard evaluation 
criterion for the quantitative measurement of the default risk. 
As the Merton model, also MKMV assumes markets are efficient; therefore it is 
necessary that prices properly reflect all the information available on the market 
otherwise the PD estimations will be distorted. Besides both approaches cannot be 
used in the case of unlisted companies (since E and !  are variables required to 
implement the models). One possible solution to this problem may be to use data on 
listed “similar ” companies of similar size in the same industry.  61
σ E
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 S. T. Bharath, T. Shumway, Forecasting Default with the Merton Distance to Default Model, Oxford 60
Journals, May 2008.
 So called Comparable Company Analysis (CCA)61
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3.    Methodology 
"
This part presents the data used for the calculation and the setting of parameters. 
In this study, we analyze stock companies, since we need market data. All data (equity 
stock prices, number of shares outstanding, short-term debt, long-term debt) are 
collected from the Datastream  database. 62
"
"
 3.1    Parameters setting 
"
  3.1.1    Observable parameters 
"
E, the market value of equity 
The value of equity is based on the stock market data. E equals the stock prices of firm 
assets times the number of shares outstanding, for each annual observation.  
Equity values are collected from Datastream, at the beginning of each year (the first 
day of the year) in which we start to forecast (in a nutshell it is the annual market 
value of equity ). 63
"
the volatility of equity ( ! ) 
The volatility of equity is somewhat observable and it can be estimated. Starting with 
the hypothesis that the stock prices  follow a Geometric Brownian Motion, we would 64
assume that the log return of historical prices at the i-day is: 
!  
σ E
ui = ln
Si
Si-1
!59
 Datastream is a database for financial and statistical information. The information is daily updated.62
 Market value: code MV in Datastream, in millions. In order to get an easier solution, we transform 63
these values in terms of billions.
 P denotes the datatype for adjusted prices in Datastream.64
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where !  is the stock price at the i-th day, !  is the stock price of the previous day. 
The standard deviation of log returns gives us the daily volatility. The annualized 
volatility can be obtained simply multiplying the daily volatility and the square root of 
the number of the trading days (approximately equals to 252). In this work, we will 
use the formula: 
!                                     (19) 
where !  is the daily volatility. 
Matlab is used for the calculation of historical volatility estimation . For more details, 65
see Appendix B. 
It is important to bear in mind that ! is the annualized percent standard deviation of 
returns and it is estimated from the prior year stock return data. In fact, we use the 
historical data to predict the volatility, then we can work out the volatility of equity in 
the following year (in practice, to estimate ! we use the historical data of the 
previous year). 
The fact deserves some consideration that the historical volatility of equity is 
estimated by using the prior year data whereas the equity value E is taken on the first 
day of the current year. Using jointly up-to-date value of equity and out-of-date value 
of volatility of equity results in an underestimation of asset volatility. 
To overcome this problem, some academics use implied volatility (that is forward 
looking on its nature and it covers the uncertainty in the market) as an alternative for 
the historical equity volatility. 
Also Barath and Shumway showed that using implied volatility improves Merton’s 
results. 
However, in this dissertation, we use historical volatility, since using implied volatility 
is more difficult (stock options are only available for a limited number of firms and 
there are volatility smiles). 
Si Si-1
σ = 1n −1 ui
2 − 1n(n −1) u ii=1
n
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
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∑
σ
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 We optimized a code in order to estimate the volatility starting from daily observations from 65
01/01/2003 to 31/12/2012. More details in Appendix B.
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the risk-free interest rate (r) 
In general, the risk-free rate is taken to be the return on government bond. The reason 
behind this is that a government cannot run out of its own currency, as it is able to 
create more if necessary. However, for currencies interbank rate, LIBOR and 
EURIBOR are also commonly used as risk-free rate. 
In this study, the 3-months Euribor  rate is used as the risk-free rate for the European 66
companies, the 3-months Treasury Bill  for the American companies. 67
Table 6 summarizes the risk-free rates used over the data window considered: 
"
the maturity time T 
In general, we will assume the liabilities maturity time is one year (it is the time 
horizon assumed in the MKMV model). 
“[…] one year is perceived as being of sufficient length for a bank to raise additional 
capital on account of increase in portfolio credit risk (if any) ”.  68
"
Table 6
year 3-months EURIBOR
3-months 
Treasury Bill
2004 2,11% 1,39%
2005 2,19% 3,21%
2006 3,08% 4,85%
2007 4,28% 4,50%
2008 4,63% 1,43%
2009 1,23% 0,15%
2010 0,81% 0,14%
2011 1,39% 0,05%
2012 0,57% 0,09%
!61
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the default point DP 
Moody’s helps us in the definition of the default point, approximating it as short-term 
liabilities plus half of long-term liabilities. 
Bharath and Shumway fix F as short-term debt plus half of long-term debt as well. 
Crosbie and Bohn (2008), Fitch Solution (2007) follow the same approach. We do the 
same. 
"
From the firm’s balance sheet, obtained directly from the Worldscope database in 
Datastream, we observe short-term and long-term debt (yearly data). 
!  
where STD is the short-term debt  and LTD is the long-term debt . 69 70
However, the default point is associated with the issue or the request of debt from the 
firms, therefore it is not constant but varies over the time. The yearly observations of 
the firm’s balance sheet items are historical data and therefore out of date.  71
"
µ, the expected growth rate 
In order to calculate the real default probability, we replace the risk-free rate r with µ. 
The determination on µ is not easy. Following an approach similar to Barath and 
Shumway, we use the ROA index as a proxy of the firm’s returns, calculated as net 
income over total assets . 72
"
At this point, knowing E, ! , T, DP, and µ we need to infer the unknown parameters: 
V and ! . 
DP= STD(T)+ 1
2
LTD(T)
σ E
σV
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 Datatype WC03051: short term debt & current portion of long term debt69
 Datatype WC03251: long-term debt70
 “The default point is in reality also a random variable”, Crosbie and Bohn, 2003.71
 Datatype WC01751: net income 72
Datatype DWTA: total assets
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  3.1.2    Unobservable parameters 
"
the total asset value V 
"
the volatility of asset value !  
The major determinant of a firm’s risk default is the volatility of assets. This is why we 
need to estimate it. It measures the uncertainty about the future value of the firm, an 
increase/decrease in volatility leads to a higher probability that the future value of the 
firm decreases/increases. 
The volatility of asset value is a function of firm’s size and industry. It is relatively 
unstable and quite sensitive to the change in asset value. There is no simple way to 
measure ! from market data. 
"
As illustrated in the previous chapter, in the second step of MKMV (inferring V and 
! ), option pricing is involved and B&S pricing theory provides a mathematical 
relationship between V and E. 
We have a system of two non-linear equations: 
!  
Solving simultaneously the two equation can sometimes be very difficult; also !
must be inverted. The reason behind this is that V and !  have a different size unit, 
since V is in terms of billions and !  is a percentage. 
We use fsolve  command in Matlab to compute V and . In this way we will find 73
estimated values for V and ! , for each year of observations. 
σV
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In literature different approaches exist: Bharath and Shumway (2008) start with an 
initial value of !  and input into the B&S formula to infer ! ; then 
input !  into the second equation to recalculate a new asset value volatility, ! .  
If !  then the process stops. Otherwise, repeat the previous steps until !  
converges with a tolerance fixed at ! . 
Our approach is setting initial values for V and !  equal to E and ! . 
By solving in this way, with a tolerance fixed as ! , we finally obtain the estimated 
asset values V and asset volatilities ! . 
"
"
 3.2    Distance to default calculation 
"
The subsequent step, after getting all the parameters, is to calculate the distance to 
default as the number of standard deviation that would result in the firm value falling 
below DP. 
We have seen that, given the normal assumption of asset returns, DD is expressed by 
the following formula: 
!                                              (20) 
Under the risk-neutral world, the formula becomes: 
!                                               (21) 
MKMV instead uses a modified formula, in order to avoid complexity due to drift 
estimation. 
In analytic terms, they calculate DD as shown in formula (17): 
σV =σ E
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!  
In our calculation, we calculate DDs by using all the formulae above in order to make 
a comparison between them. 
"
"
   3.2.1    Distance to capital for financial firms 
"
For financial firms we then calculate the distance-to-capital ratio as in (18): 
!  
with ! . 
"
"
 3.3    Probability of Default calculation 
"
The last step calculates the probability of default. Since we do not have the same 
information of MKMV, we estimate the probability of default keeping in mind the 
assumption about normality of assets return and using both real-world and risk-neutral 
world formula for DD. 
In other words, we simply calculate the PD as: 
"
"
"
 3.4    Sample selection 
"
Our final sample contains 60 European and American companies. 
DDKMV =
VT - DPT
VTσV
DC=
ln V0
λDPT
+ µ -σV
2
2
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟T
σV T
λ= 8%
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3.   Methodology
We have chosen 30 European (financial and non financial) firms and 30 American 
(financial and non financial) firms, defaulted  and not defaulted , over the data 74 75
window 2004-2012. 
The non financial companies are collected from different industries in order to capture 
as much information as possible and to study how PD varies when industry, size, 
geographic locations and some other factors change. 
The sample contains both financial and non financial firms: financial firms are 
characterized by high leverage and strict regulation, therefore deserve special 
attention . 76
Table 7 lists the European defaulted firms. 
Table 8 lists the European not defaulted firms. 
Table 9 lists the American defaulted firms. 
Table 10 lists the American not defaulted firms. 
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
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 Information about defaulted companies is collected from annual default reports of Moody’s and 74
Standard & Poor’s. These reports cover firms that have been rated sometimes, both large and small 
firms. However default information about small firms sometimes is not reliable, therefore we filter 
them out of sample.
 Not defaulted firms are chosen from different sizes, industries and geographic locations.75
 For example, it is hard have a “right” definition of the default barrier, since they are strictly 76
regulated.
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"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Table 7: European Defaulted firms
Datastream 
Code Firm name Country Industry initial default type defaulted
financial firms
ALBKL Allied Irish Bank Ireland
bank and financial 
service distressed exchange in 2011
ANGL Anglo Irish Bank Ireland
bank and financial 
service distressed exchange in 2009
DK:ROS Roskilde  Bank Denmark
bank and financial 
service Missed interest payment in 2008
non financial 
firms
D:AROX Arcandor Germany holding information missed in 2009
I:ITH IT Holding Italy clothing Missed principal and interest payment in 2009
VX:STL Stato Oil Hydro Norwey oil and gas information missed in 2009
WTFU Waterford Ireland customer service Missed interest payment in 2009
!67
3.   Methodology
"
"
"
Table 8: European Not Defaulted firms
Datastream 
Code Firm name Country Industry
financial firms
E:BBVA Banco Bilbao Spain bank and financial service
F:BNP BNP Paribas France bank and financial service
HSBA HSBC England bank and financial service
I:MB Mediobanca Italy bank and financial service
F:SGE Societe Generale France bank and financial service
I:UCG Unicredit Italy bank and financial service
non financial 
firms
D:ADS Adidas Germany clothing and consumer goods
B:ABI Anheuser-Busch InBev Belgium beverages
BP. Bp England oil and gas
I:ENI ENI Italy oil and gas
GSK Glaxosmithkline England pharmaceutical
I:LUX Luxottica Italy retail
DK:DSB Maersk Danimark transport
S:NOVN Novartis Switzerland pharmaceutical
RIO Riotinto England metals and mining
S:ROG Roche Switzerland pharmaceutical
RDSB Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands oil and gas
W:SAAB Saab Sweden aerospace and defense
D:SIE Siemens Germany conglomerate
E:TEF Telefonica Spain telecommunication
F:TAL Total France oil and gas
VOD Vodafone England telecommunication
W:VOBF Volvo Sweden motor Vehicle
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"
"
"
"
"
"
Table 9: American Defaulted firms
Datastream 
code Firm name Industry Initial default type Defaulted
financial firms
545088 Ambac Financial Group
financial 
service Chapter 11
8 November 
2011
510401 Corus steel information missed 11 September 2009
510115 Indymac banking information missed 11 July 2008
50669U MF Global financial service Chapter 11
31 October 
2011
50669U PMI Group financial service Chapter 11 October 2011
non financial 
firms
D:BL6X Blockbuster home entertainment Chapter 11
23 September 
2010
329034 Delta Petroleum gas and oil bankruptcy 16 December 2011
13982J General Maritime oil Chapter 11 17 November 2011
13677C GMX Resosurces oil, gas and coal distressed exchange 2011
895273 Trailer Bridge transportation Chapter 11 November 2011
329723 Wolwerine textile distressed exchange 2010
D:YELX YRC Worldwide transportation distressed exchange 2011
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"
"
Our final sample contains yearly observations of 60 firms with 19 cases of defaults 
over 9 years observations. 
"
"
"
"
Table 10: American Not Defaulted firms
Datastream 
code Firm name Industry
financial firms
U:BAC Bank of America bank and financial service
U:BK Bank of New York bank and financial service
U:C Citygroup bank and financial service
U:JPM JP Morgan bank and financial service
U:PNC PNC Bank bank and financial service
U:WFC Wells Fargo bank and financial service
non financial 
firms
U:ARG Airgas gas
U:CAT Caterpillar heavy equipment, engines, financial service
U:GE General Electric conglomerate
U:GWW Grainger industrial supply distribution
U:HPQ Hewlett-Packard IT services
U:IBM IBM IT services
@INTC Intel semiconductors
U:NKE Nike apparel, accessories
U:PG Procter & Gamble consumer goods
U:TSO Tesoro Corporation oil and gas
U:WCC Wesco International maintenance, repair and operations
U:WHR Whirpool household appliances
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4.    Results and analysis 
"
In this study we have included both financial and non financial firms, European and 
American companies. 
Let’s start our analysis and discussion of results with the defaulted companies and then 
we will discuss the not defaulted ones. 
"
"
 4.1    USA defaulted firms 
"
The sample contains 12 American firms that defaulted in the data window considered. 
5 of them are financial, 7 are non financial. 
Before starting our analysis it is important to remember that for financial firms we 
calculate the Distance to Capital ratio and the expected default probability is then 
calculate on this ratio (DC and ! respectively). 
In order to better understand this risk measure, in this part we will present and discuss 
our estimated values, giving some information about the sample companies, when 
necessary. 
"
financial firms (table 11): 
The defaulted financial firms included in this study are: Ambac Financial Group, 
Corus, Indymac, MFGlobal and PMI Group. Information about the reasons and the 
date of default can be founded in table 9. 
Ambac: the volatility of equity increases more and more reaching very high levels in 
2009. The probability of default also increases continuously with its peak in 2008 until 
the default date. 
Corus: the PD does not seem to have any predictive power, even up to one year before 
default when the PD is only at 0,22%. 
Corus fails on September, 2009 when the volatility of equity is at 143,9%. 
PDC
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Indymac: PD rises continuously until the default date (2008) reaching a maximum of 
5,03%. However, this level is not alarming, even if “the failure of Indymac Bank on 
July, 11, 2008 was the fourth largest bank failure in US history” . 77
MF Global: it declares bankruptcy in 2011 and unfortunately historical data between 
2004 and 2007 is not available. But, in the subsequent years, the data at our disposal 
gives us back a very high PD, announcing then a likely failure of it. 
PMI Group: the PD is equal to zero from 2004 to 2007. Then the volatility of equity 
greatly increases and so the PD, up to a maximum of 75,22% in 2009 and 56,75% in 
2010, one year prior to bankruptcy. 
"
Here below, the historical volatility of equity and the probability of default are 
illustrated throughout the period considered. 
"
"
!  
"
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!  
"
non-financial firms (table 12): 
The defaulted American non financial firms included in our study are: Blockbuster, 
Delta Petroleum, General Maritime, GMX Resources Industry, Trailer Bridge, 
Wolverine and YRC Worldwide. 
Blockbuster: it shows a high volatility in 2010 with a low PD level. The highest level 
of PD (18,15%) is recorded in 2006 with a volatility of equity at 95,69%. It is worth 
noting that, in 2007, the control of the company passed from Antioco to Keyes and a 
new business strategy was implemented. Due to the competition from some other 
companies such as Netflix and Redbox, Blockbuster failed on September 23, 2010. 
Delta Petroleum: from 2009 to 2012 we can observe high PD. 
General Maritime: it fails on November, 2011. In the same year, the volatility is not 
at his peak (achieved in 2009) and the PD is equal to 12,99% as against 24,5% of the 
previous year. 
GMX Resources Industry, Trailer Bridge, Wolverine and YRC Worldwide have 
high levels of PD, always increasing at least 2 years before the default event. 
"
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"
"
!  
"
"
!  
"
"
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 4.2    EU defaulted firms 
"
The sample contains 7 European firms: Allied Irish Bank, Anglo Irish Bank, 
Roskilde Bank, Arcandor, IT Holding, Stato Oil Hydro and Waterford. 
"
financial firms (table 13): 
Allied Irish Bank: defaulted in 2011; since 2008 the PD level is significantly high, 
at 96,98% in 2009 and 100% in 2010. 
Anglo Irish Bank: defaulted in 2009; the PD in 2008 was 25,15% and at not alarming 
levels in the previous years. 
Roskilde Bank: this danish bank defaulted in 2008; in the same year was bought by 
the National Bank after running in financial trouble. 
The PD does not have any predictive power, either before or in the year of default. 
"
"
!  
"
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!  
"
non financial firms (table 14): 
Arcandor: it requested financial help from the German Government, which was 
rejected by the European Commission, on 3 June 2009 . The company collapsed some 78
days later. The PD does not give any distressing signal. Only the volatility reaches 
100,02% in 2009. Our empirical predictions do not give any early forecast. 
Same considerations for IT Holding and Stato Oil Hydro, PD levels do not seem 
alarming. 
Waterford: there is a little predictive power up to 2-3 years before the default event. 
High values of ! and PDs increasing continuously suggest a visible tendency of 
default. 
In the figures below the blue line shows the historical volatility of Waterford, reaching 
very high level. 
"
"
"
σ E
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 4.3    USA not defaulted firms  
"
financial firms (table 15): 
The american financial firms not defaulted included in our sample are: 
Bank of America: in 2009 and 2010 records high level of PD. 
Bank of New York, Citigroup, JP Morgan, PNC Bank and Wells Fargo: high 
volatility during the financial crisis with very low level of PD. 
"
"
"
!  
"
"
"
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!  
"
"
"
non financial firms (table 16): 
The non financial American companies not defaulted are: Airgas, Caterpillar, 
General Electric, Grainger, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Intel, Nike, Procter & 
Gamble, Tesoro, Wesco International and Whirpool. 
All these companies have very low levels of PD. We just report the case of Tesoro, 
which has a probability of default equals to 8,80% in 2009. 
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
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"
"
!  
"
"
!  
"
"
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 4.4    EU not defaulted firms 
  
financial firms (table 17): 
The financial EU firm not defaulted are: Banco Bilbao, BNP Paribas, HSBC, 
Mediobanca, Societe Generale and Unicredit. 
Between 2007-2010, the !  always increases and this could be a signal of distress 
for those companies (this effect is confirmed also from the high level of volatility). 
BNP Paribas and Unicredit recorded the highest level of ! , with 61,16% and 
62,33% respectively, in 2009. 
Our empirical results then suggest that HSBC and Mediobanca were those who had a 
faster recovery after the financial crisis. 
"
"
"
!  
"
"
"
PD
C
PD
C
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!  
"
"
non financial firms (table 18): 
The non financial European companies not defaulted are: Adidas, Anheuser Busch 
InBev, BP, ENI, Glaxosmithkline, Luxottica, Maersk, Novartis, Rio Tinto, Roche, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Saab, Siemens, Telefonica, Total, Vodafone and Volvo. 
Most companies have an PD almost equals to zero, which generally tends to be greater 
than zero (even if very slightly) just in 2009 (this happens in 14 cases out of 17). 
The highest PD is observed for Rio Tinto at 5,20%  and Volvo at 3,23% . 
"
The historical volatility and default probability trends below: 
"
"
"
"
"
"
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"
 
"
"
!  
"
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 4.5    Further considerations 
"
In general, during the financial crisis, the volatility of equity always rises and DD 
contracts: as a result PD increases. 
Table 19 illustrates the DD trend between European countries regarding not defaulted 
firms. Chart 1 below shows how countries like Spain, Italy, Belgium, Denmark have 
lower DD level, whereas Switzerland and Netherlands, for example, have higher DD. 
However, in 2009, DD levels decrease dramatically for all countries, before recovering 
slowly in subsequent years. 
"
"
"
!  
"
"
"
Chart 1: real-world DD in Europe
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Table 21 compares the DD levels between USA-EU, once more for not defaulted 
firms. The trend between them is almost similar (chart 2). 
"
!  
"
It is also interesting do the same analysis for defaulted firms and find out some 
differences. Chart 3 proves that EU has suffered the most from the crises (highlithed 
from a drop in DD level in 2009 first and in 2011 later), unlike the USA that manages 
to maintain DD levels approximately equal to zero since 2009. 
"
!  
Chart 2: real-world average DD comparison between EU 
and USA, not defaulted firms
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Chart 3: real-world average DD comparison between 
EU and USA, defaulted firms
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Finally, it seemed useful to make a ranking by industry (table 25-28). Data tells that 
the financial sector was that one that suffered most by decreasing levels of DD and 
therefore increasing levels of PD (in both USA and EU) followed by transport and 
motor vehicle industry. In EU the industry that overcome seems to be the 
pharmaceutical sector, in USA the retail and consumer goods sector. 
These results are illustrated in the chart 4 and 5. 
"
"
"
"
"
!  
"
"
"
"
"
"
Chart 4: DD comparison per industry in EU
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"
!  
"
As regard instead the comparison between financial and non financial firms it could 
generally be deduced that, from the data collected, financial firms have PD levels 
higher than non financial firms, due to the issues pointed out before (i.e high leverage, 
strict regulations). 
"
It must be emphasized that PD is not always effective of predicting the default event 
or at least to report a burdensome condition of a firm: companies as Citigroup, 
Unicredit, BNP Paribas, for example, recorded PD levels quite high in 2009 before 
falling back to lower levels in the subsequent years; other times, PD levels very very 
low that do not suspect any troubles, but the companies defaulted (examples in this 
regard are Corus (table 11), Roskilde Bank (table 13), Arcandor (table 14), IT 
Holding (table 14), Stato Oil Hydro (table 14) ). 
Experiences such as these are possibly due to the high volatility of the market. Further 
extension of the analysis should consider different ratios such as debt on equity, that is 
very relevant for this kind of analysis (since assumptions on liabilities and asset value 
Chart 5: DD comparison per industry in USA
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are fundamental in our analysis), the impact of crisis on different industries, the impact 
of Basel III requirements, etc. 
All in all, for purposes of comparison, we observed the DD trend using three different 
formulae: 
!  using [formula (17)] 
!  using µ as drift [formula (20)] 
!  using the risk-free interest rate [(formula (21)] 
!  
!  
DD
KMV
DD
µ
DD
rf
Chart 6: DDs comparison in USA, defaulted firms
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Chart 7: DDs comparison in EU, defaulted firms
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"
"
!  
"
"
!  
"
"
Chart 8: DDs comparison in USA, not defaulted firms
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Chart 9: DDs comparison in EU, not defaulted firms
D
D
s  
va
lu
e
0
3,5
7
10,5
14
year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
average DD (KMV) average DD (rf) average DD (µ)
!89
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
!90
Conclusion 
"
The structural changes in the last decades have focused attention on an urgent need to 
develop an effective prediction model in order to avoid unexpected company default 
and to assess the most efficient way to measure credit risk and its components. 
In this work we have seen different approaches used to measure and manage credit risk 
and somehow to discriminate between firms that will default and those that won’t. 
The main purpose was to investigate if the distance to default (DD) ratio has a real 
forecasting power in predicting corporate’s default. 
"
The main effort in the first two chapters was to give a general idea about the Merton 
model and its implementation, the basic idea beyond the model, its limits and the main 
role it plays in the credit risk management modeling. This initial part is followed by a 
description of the MKMV model and the EDF score, a trademark and property of 
Moody’s: an analysis is made regarding its goodness as predictor of default and its 
ability to provide an early warning power than other risk measure. 
"
The second part of this thesis is empirical: after introducing the methodology we 
adopted for estimating the parameters necessary to implement the model, we used real 
data to examine the probability of default of 60 stock companies (since we need 
market data), over the period 2004-2012 in the EU and in the USA. All data are 
collected from the Datastream database. 
"
The last part of this study is about the interpretation of the findings. 
Our results suggests that sometimes DD showed a predictive power, warning the risk 
of default up to 2,5 years before the event. Other times, this ratio has not been able to 
offer any valid help for the prevention of an event so expensive and unpredictable as 
the default is. Moreover, the DD indicator cannot fully capture the complexities 
associated with asymmetric information problems and regulation restrictions (this is a 
!91
reason why other measures have been introduced, such as the distance to capital ratio 
for financial firms). 
"
Furthermore, our results indicate that there are no significant differences between the 
USA and the EU firms, apart from the fact that the recovery after the financial crisis 
seems to have been much faster in the former than in the latter. 
In addition, it must be emphasized that the results presented in this study should be 
interpreted with caution as they are based on limited sample of firms that covers a 
short period of time. A larger sample size and a longer time horizon  would 79
significantly increase the reliability of the forecasts. At this point it should be clear that 
the simultaneous calculation of unobservable variables, the simplified assumptions on 
which the model is based, the lack of transparency of the financial markets and some 
other issues do not increase the reliability of the forecast. 
"
Ultimately, our results indicate that the MKMV model is useful to identify risk levels 
and thus discriminate firms. To a large extent is able to predict default having regard to 
all the considerations and the shortcomings set out above. However, in spite of these 
limitation, the Merton approach (and consequently the MKMV approach) remains a 
very fundamental approach to credit risk models.  
!92
 We know that the greater the time horizon, the more difficult it will be the forecasting and the 79
reliability of the estimation.
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Summary statistics
List of tables: summary statistics 
"
Legend: 
"
! : equity volatility, expressed as a decimal number 
E: equity value, expressed in milliards 
DP: default point value, expressed in milliards 
µ: drift estimation, expressed as a decimal number 
V: asset value, expressed in milliards 
! : asset volatility, expressed as a decimal number 
! : distance to default calculated with the formula (17) 
! :distance to default calculated with the formula (21) 
! : distance to default calculated with the formula (20) 
! : probability of default with risk-free interest rate,expressed  in percentage terms 
! : probability of default with drift, expressed in percentage terms 
DC: distance to capital 
! : probability of default calculated on DC, expressed in percentage terms 
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
σ E
σV
DDKMV
DDrf
DDµ
PDrf
PDµ
PDC
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Table 11: USA - defaulted - financial firms
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Ambac 2004 0,2318 7,87 8,01 0,0433 15,7700 0,1157 4,25 6,17 5,92 0,0000 0,0000 5,4500 0,0000
Ambac 2005 0,1637 8,22 8,37 0,0404 16,3300 0,0824 5,91 8,56 8,46 0,0000 0,0000 7,5400 0,0000
Ambac 2006 0,2561 8,38 8,85 0,0444 16,8100 0,1276 3,71 5,31 5,34 0,0000 0,0000 4,6600 0,0002
Ambac 2007 0,1424 8,96 9,64 -0,1603 18,1700 0,0702 6,69 6,71 9,64 0,0000 0,0000 5,5200 0,0000
Ambac 2008 0,6512 0,65 4,29 -0,2615 4,8700 0,0925 1,29 -1,51 1,48 93,3910 6,9934 -2,4100 99,1961
Ambac 2009 2,3790 0,25 3,61 -0,0010 1,4200 1,0947 -1,40 -1,40 -1,40 91,9001 91,8654 -1,4700 92,9833
Ambac 2010 1,5958 0,23 8,96 -0,0399 8,4500 0,1249 -0,48 -0,85 -0,52 80,2664 69,8706 -1,5200 93,5582
Ambac 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Ambac 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Corus 2004 0,2069 1,08 0,13 0,0269 1,21 0,1848 4,82 12,07 12 0 0 11,62 0
Corus 2005 0,2321 1,29 0,23 0,0273 1,51 0,1976 4,28 9,52 9,55 0 0 9,1 0
Corus 2006 0,2715 1,70 0,21 0,0224 1,91 0,2427 3,66 9,01 9,12 0 0 8,67 0
Corus 2007 0,3217 1,06 0,23 0,0106 1,28 0,2661 3,08 6,33 6,46 0 0 6,02 0
Corus 2008 0,5429 0,61 0,21 -0,0511 0,81 0,408 1,83 3,05 3,21 0,11544 0,06694 2,84 0,22346
Corus 2009 1,4389 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Corus 2010 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Corus 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Corus 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Indymac 2004 0,2969 2,01 7,93 0,0129 9,83 0,0607 3,18 3,72 3,74 0,00993 0,00929 2,35 0,9470
Indymac 2005 0,2818 2,07 9,75 0,0178 11,52 0,0507 3,02 3,6 3,89 0,01566 0,00509 1,96 2,5015
Indymac 2006 0,2711 2,68 11,81 0,0160 13,93 0,0521 2,92 3,45 4,07 0,02832 0,00235 1,85 3,2287
Indymac 2007 0,2859 2,17 7,71 -0,0208 9,54 0,065 2,95 2,92 3,94 0,17288 0,00415 1,64 5,0376
Indymac 2008 0,6736 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Indymac 2009 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Indymac 2010 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Indymac 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Indymac 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
MF Global 2004 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
MF Global 2005 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
MF Global 2006 NaN 0,00 3,33 0,0000 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
MF Global 2007 NaN 0,00 18,28 0,0033 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
MF Global 2008 NaN 1,20 20,37 -0,0013 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
MF Global 2009 1,8830 0,53 14,89 -0,0010 11,81 0,3076 -0,85 -0,91 -0,9 82 81,6343 -1,18 88,1151
MF Global 2010 0,8105 0,98 29,47 -0,0030 30,33 0,0315 0,9 0,8 0,94 21 17,4283 -1,85 96,7855
MF Global 2011 0,3953 1,33 17,22 -0,0036 18,53 0,0284 2,5 2,45 2,6 0,70971 0,4688 -0,48 68,5586
! PDrf
! PDµ
! PDrf
! PDµ
! PDµ
!σ V " DC
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!σ E ! DDKMV ! PDC
! DDrf
!σ E ! DDKMV ! PDC
! DDrf
! DDrf
! DDµ
! DDrf
! DDµ
! DDµ
! PDrf
! DDµ
! PDrf
!96
Summary statistics
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
MF Global 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
PMI Group 2004 0,2968 3,47 0,41 0,0849 3,87 0,2658 3,36 8,64 8,37 0,0000 0,0000 8,32 0,0000
PMI Group 2005 0,2171 3,62 0,41 0,0810 4,02 0,1957 4,59 11,99 11,74 0,0000 0,0000 11,56 0,0000
PMI Group 2006 0,1810 4,08 0,25 0,0808 4,32 0,1711 5,51 17,08 16,89 0,0000 0,0000 16,59 0,0000
PMI Group 2007 0,1376 3,95 0,25 -0,1720 4,19 0,1298 7,25 20,37 22,04 0,0000 0,0000 19,73 0,0000
PMI Group 2008 0,7374 0,58 0,24 -0,1851 0,82 0,526 1,34 1,71 2,09 4,3978 1,8519 1,55 6,0841
PMI Group 2009 1,6405 0,05 0,19 -0,1399 0,19 0,7109 -0,01 -0,56 -0,37 71,3617 64,2456 -0,68 75,2153
PMI Group 2010 1,5841 0,37 0,31 -0,1732 0,61 1,1039 0,45 -0,09 0,06 53,7684 47,4662 -0,17 56,7548
PMI Group 2011 0,9160 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
PMI Group 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
! DDKMV
!σ E
!σ E
" DC! PDrf! DDrf!σ V
" DC! PDrf! DDrf!σ V
! PDC! PDµ! DDµ! DDKMV
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Table 12: USA - defaulted - non financial firms
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Blockbuster 2004 0,28 0,48 0,59 -0,2572 1,06 0,1268 3,51 2,55 4,69 0,53142 0,00013
Blockbuster 2005 0,4144 1,46 0,6 -0,1557 2,03 0,2965 2,38 3,46 4,09 0,0271 0,00213
Blockbuster 2006 0,9569 0,39 0,53 0,0187 0,89 0,4604 0,86 0,91 0,97 18,1530216,49638
Blockbuster 2007 0 0,4 0,41 -0,0284 0,78 0 Inf Inf Inf 0 0
Blockbuster 2008 0,1949 0,34 0,51 -0,1488 0,84 0,0781 5,02 4,43 6,52 0,00047 0
Blockbuster 2009 0,3955 0,33 0,54 -0,2804 0,86 0,1499 2,52 1,22 3,1 11,12624 0,09659
Blockbuster 2010 1,4201 0,06 0 -0,1908 0,06 1,4047 0,7 2,38 2,52 0,86282 0,59011
Blockbuster 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Blockbuster 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Delta Petroleum 2004 0,3657 0,26 0,03 0,0217 0,3 0,3234 2,73 6,54 6,51 0 0
Delta Petroleum 2005 0,4865 0,59 0,13 -0,0945 0,71 0,4016 2,04 3,83 4,15 0,00638 0,00169
Delta Petroleum 2006 0,4694 1,03 0,18 0,0006 1,21 0,4014 2,11 4,49 4,61 0,00035 0,0002
Delta Petroleum 2007 0,4906 1,26 0,21 -0,1753 1,46 0,4243 2,02 3,99 4,51 0,00335 0,00033
Delta Petroleum 2008 0,4967 2,28 0,67 -0,4096 2,93 0,3857 2 2,59 3,69 0,4759 0,01113
Delta Petroleum 2009 1,1484 0,13 0,42 -0,1735 0,52 0,3784 0,53 -0,06 0,4 52,4093234,38059
Delta Petroleum 2010 1,5475 0,43 0,31 -0,145 0,68 1,1009 0,49 0,02 0,15 49,1498543,86938
Delta Petroleum 2011 0,7235 0,27 0,31 -0,4708 0,57 0,344 1,34 0,25 1,62 40,15498 5,26834
Delta Petroleum 2012 1,429 0,01 0,04 -0,1399 0,05 0,6108 0,26 -0,25 -0,02 60,0571950,97063
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
General Maritime 2004 0,4312 0,75 0,26 0,2494 1,01 0,3208 2,31 4,82 4,09 0,00007 0,0022
General Maritime 2005 0,4882 1,85 0,07 0,1488 1,92 0,4715 2,05 7,18 6,93 0 0
General Maritime 2006 0,3455 1,32 0,03 0,1365 1,34 0,3394 2,89 11,97 11,71 0 0
General Maritime 2007 0,239 1,42 0,28 0,0528 1,69 0,2008 4,15 9,07 9,03 0 0
General Maritime 2008 0,5064 0,76 0,5 0,0357 1,25 0,3093 1,95 2,96 2,89 0,15332 0,19158
General Maritime 2009 0,8576 0,44 0,51 -0,0076 0,94 0,4213 1,08 1,22 1,24 11,1237210,71852
General Maritime 2010 0,6289 0,43 1,38 -0,1499 1,8 0,1564 1,51 0,69 1,66 24,4986 4,87186
General Maritime 2011 0,494 0,18 0,89 -0,0857 1,07 0,085 1,99 1,13 2,14 12,9972 1,61231
General Maritime 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
GMX Resosurces 2004 1,0693 0,04 0 0,0458 0,04 1,0129 0,93 2,42 2,39 0,77344 0,84304
GMX Resosurces 2005 0,715 0,09 0,01 0,1746 0,1 0,6717 1,4 4,05 3,84 0,00256 0,0062
GMX Resosurces 2006 0,6084 0,35 0,02 0,0885 0,37 0,5754 1,64 4,85 4,78 0,00006 0,00009
GMX Resosurces 2007 0,6258 0,42 0,07 0,0583 0,48 0,5451 1,59 3,51 3,49 0,02239 0,02455
GMX Resosurces 2008 0,3791 0,4 0,12 -0,2184 0,52 0,2943 2,63 4,15 4,94 0,00166 0,00004
GMX Resosurces 2009 1,0051 0,15 0,1 -0,3271 0,24 0,6425 0,93 0,59 1,1 27,6626113,47079
GMX Resosurces 2010 1,0102 0,28 0,14 -0,281 0,42 0,6977 0,95 0,79 1,2 21,3441911,52088
GMX Resosurces 2011 0,6318 0,31 0,21 -0,431 0,52 0,3774 1,57 1,05 2,2 14,59363 1,39916
GMX Resosurces 2012 0,8351 0,1 0,22 -0,3873 0,31 0,2794 1,06 -0,28 1,11 60,8556713,26504
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Trailer Bridge 2004 0,8946 0,06 0,06 0,0459 0,11 0,4875 1,03 1,29 1,22 9,89761 11,08924
Trailer Bridge 2005 0,6942 0,11 0,05 0,0686 0,17 0,4737 1,41 2,24 2,16 1,2621 1,53606
Trailer Bridge 2006 0,3983 0,11 0,05 -0,0002 0,16 0,2688 2,45 3,86 4,05 0,00557 0,00261
Trailer Bridge 2007 0,3625 0,11 0,06 -0,0021 0,16 0,2419 2,7 4,23 4,43 0,00114 0,00047
Trailer Bridge 2008 0,4555 0,11 0,06 -0,0266 0,16 0,2981 2,18 3,28 3,41 0,05245 0,03199
Trailer Bridge 2009 0,6216 0,03 0,06 0,0211 0,09 0,233 1,57 1,92 1,84 2,72661 3,29894
Trailer Bridge 2010 1,0399 0,06 0,09 -0,0195 0,15 0,4664 0,78 0,7 0,74 24,2196722,84312
Trailer Bridge 2011 0,4821 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Trailer Bridge 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Wolverine 2004 0,4651 0,09 0,12 0,0007 0,21 0,2071 2,11 2,67 2,73 0,37824 0,31219
Wolverine 2005 0,5157 0,14 0,12 -0,0658 0,25 0,2849 1,88 2,33 2,67 0,9967 0,37777
Wolverine 2006 0,4282 0,06 0,12 -0,1427 0,18 0,1544 2,13 1,57 2,81 5,76477 0,24528
Wolverine 2007 1,2304 0,03 0,16 -0,2553 0,17 0,3092 0,19 -0,79 0,19 78,3863242,62987
Wolverine 2008 1,0311 0,04 0,08 -0,1321 0,11 0,3883 0,72 0,31 0,69 37,8142624,59324
Wolverine 2009 1,6845 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Wolverine 2010 2,4487 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Wolverine 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Wolverine 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
YRC Worldwide 2004 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
YRC Worldwide 2005 NaN 2,31 1,06 0,0794 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
YRC Worldwide 2006 NaN 2,29 0,75 0,0482 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
YRC Worldwide 2007 0,408 1,52 0,82 -0,1073 2,3 0,2686 2,39 3,3 3,86 0,04883 0,00558
YRC Worldwide 2008 0,4561 0,79 0,97 -0,1925 1,74 0,2068 2,15 1,81 2,81 3,49827 0,24617
YRC Worldwide 2009 0 0,82 0,67 -0,1568 1,49 0 Inf Inf Inf 0 0
YRC Worldwide 2010 2,5356 4,21 0,64 -0,1063 4,53 2,4081 0,36 -0,44 -0,39 66,8846665,24762
YRC Worldwide 2011 3,3488 0,13 0,68 -0,1579 0,17 2,9333 -0,99 -1,99 -1,93 97,6463197,32969
YRC Worldwide 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
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Table 13: EU - defaulted - financial firms
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Allied Irish 
Bank 2004 0,2194 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Allied Irish 
Bank 2005 0,1707 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Allied Irish 
Bank 2006 0,1379 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Allied Irish 
Bank 2007 0,2108 19,71 76,21 0,0121 92,72 0,0448 3,97 4,62 5,31 0,00019 0,00001 2,76 0,28508
Allied Irish 
Bank 2008 0,3477 11,71 59,35 0,0041 68,38 0,0596 2,22 2,41 3,12 0,78782 0,08965 1,02 15,49293
Allied Irish 
Bank 2009 0,8917 0,58 62,49 -0,0106 62,22 0,0109 -0,4 -1,38 0,72 91,6878423,43577 -9,06 100
Allied Irish 
Bank 2010 1,6777 1,39 61,81 -0,0576 56,73 0,1349 -0,66 -1,13 -0,64 87,0748173,98761 -1,75 95,97648
Allied Irish 
Bank 2011 0,9349 0,27 48,68 -0,0246 48,22 0,0071 -1,33 -4,79 0,62 99,9999126,61193 -16,5 100
Allied Irish 
Bank 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Anglo Irish 
Bank 2004 0,2424 4,17 8,93 0,0149 12,92 0,0783 3,94 4,86 4,94 0,00006 0,00004 3,8 0,00729
Anglo Irish 
Bank 2005 0,2242 6,79 15,27 0,0143 21,72 0,07 4,24 5,2 5,31 0,00001 0,00001 4,01 0,00299
Anglo Irish 
Bank 2006 0,2159 9,61 23,39 0,0136 32,29 0,0642 4,29 5,2 5,47 0,00001 0 3,9 0,00478
Anglo Irish 
Bank 2007 0,2322 12,24 27,11 0,0136 38,21 0,0744 3,91 4,76 5,16 0,0001 0,00001 3,64 0,01355
Anglo Irish 
Bank 2008 0,3761 5,98 35,54 0,0069 39,91 0,0564 1,94 2,15 2,85 1,58739 0,22148 0,67 25,14687
Anglo Irish 
Bank 2009 1,6597 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Anglo Irish 
Bank 2010 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Anglo Irish 
Bank 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Anglo Irish 
Bank 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Roskilde Bank 2004 0,2091 1,97 3,54 0,0218 5,43 0,0757 4,6 5,91 5,9 0 0 4,81 0,00008
Roskilde Bank 2005 0,2244 2,64 4,54 0,0307 7,09 0,0838 4,29 5,64 5,54 0 0 4,65 0,00017
Roskilde Bank 2006 0,1721 7,19 9,59 0,0303 16,49 0,0751 5,58 7,59 7,6 0 0 6,48 0
Roskilde Bank 2007 0,22 7,84 13,02 0,0081 20,32 0,0849 4,23 5,29 5,7 0,00001 0 4,31 0,00081
Roskilde Bank 2008 0,2272 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Roskilde Bank 2009 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Roskilde Bank 2010 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Roskilde Bank 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Roskilde Bank 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
! DDrf
! PDC
! DDKMV
! PDrf
! PDC
! DDKMV
" DC
! PDrf
!σ E ! DDµ
! DDKMV
" DC!σ E
!σ V
! DDµ
" DC!σ E
!σ V
! PDµ
! DDµ
! DDrf
!σ V
! PDµ! DDrf
! PDC
! PDµ
! PDrf
!100
Summary statistics
""
Table 14: EU - defaulted - non financial firms
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Arcandor 2004 0,44 2,13 2,2 -0,1777 4,28 0,2191 2,22 2,12 3,03 1,67952 0,12131
Arcandor 2005 0,4801 1,56 2,23 -0,0362 3,74 0,2008 2,01 2,3 2,59 1,07974 0,48442
Arcandor 2006 0,3577 4,56 0,69 0,0388 5,23 0,3118 2,78 6,45 6,43 0 0
Arcandor 2007 0,4281 6,01 1,87 -0,0562 7,8 0,3297 2,31 4 4,3 0,00323 0,00087
Arcandor 2008 0,3174 2,64 2,56 -0,0574 5,09 0,1647 3,01 3,73 4,36 0,00951 0,00065
Arcandor 2009 1,0219 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Arcandor 2010 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Arcandor 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Arcandor 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
IT Holding 2004 0,3336 0,45 0,35 -0,0103 0,79 0,1913 2,95 4,19 4,36 0,00136 0,00065
IT Holding 2005 0,3045 0,46 0,26 -0,0206 0,72 0,1957 3,24 4,94 5,16 0,00004 0,00001
IT Holding 2006 0,3179 0,42 0,25 -0,0151 0,66 0,2022 3,09 4,67 4,9 0,00015 0,00005
IT Holding 2007 0,2512 0,36 0,27 0,0044 0,62 0,1476 3,86 5,67 5,93 0 0
IT Holding 2008 0,4014 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
IT Holding 2009 0,8171 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
IT Holding 2010 0,4545 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
IT Holding 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
IT Holding 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Stato Oil 
Hydro 2004 0,1979 187,21 20,46 0,1128 207,24 0,1788 5,04 13,49 12,98 0 0
Stato Oil 
Hydro 2005 0,2333 249,61 17,86 0,1239 267,09 0,2181 4,28 12,86 12,4 0 0
Stato Oil 
Hydro 2006 0,273 378,8 20,65 0,1407 398,82 0,2593 3,66 11,83 11,41 0 0
Stato Oil 
Hydro 2007 0,3209 329,53 28,35 0,1399 356,7 0,2964 3,11 8,87 8,54 0 0
Stato Oil 
Hydro 2008 0,2512 473,2 48 0,0897 519,02 0,229 3,96 10,67 10,48 0 0
Stato Oil 
Hydro 2009 NaN 325,24 56,13 0,0317 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Stato Oil 
Hydro 2010 NaN 325,24 61,63 0,0679 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Stato Oil 
Hydro 2011 NaN 325,24 75,65 0,1229 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Stato Oil 
Hydro 2012 NaN 325,24 68,9 0,0903 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Waterford 2004 0,7633 0,26 0,22 -0,0572 0,48 0,4244 1,25 1,44 1,62 7,51741 5,23174
Waterford 2005 0,8955 0,11 0,15 -0,2254 0,26 0,424 0,99 0,53 1,12 29,67025 13,19585
Waterford 2006 1,2097 0,21 0,2 -0,2464 0,39 0,7293 0,67 0,21 0,59 41,65579 27,7336
Waterford 2007 1,0989 0,34 0,22 -0,1004 0,54 0,7321 0,82 0,74 0,94 22,90214 17,42072
Waterford 2008 1,7088 0,07 0,25 -0,339 0,23 0,797 -0,11 -0,92 -0,44 82,2497 67,05687
Waterford 2009 NaN 0,08 0 0 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Waterford 2010 NaN 0,08 0 0 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Waterford 2011 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Waterford 2012 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
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Table 15: USA - not defaulted - financial firms
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Bank of 
America 2004 0,2018 115,7 252,13 0,0192 364,35 0,0641 4,81 6,01 5,93 0 0 4,71 0,00012
Bank of 
America 2005 0,1336 179,58 412,94 0,0148 579,47 0,0414 6,94 8,52 8,94 0 0 6,5 0
Bank of 
America 2006 0,126 216,49 440,42 0,0163 636,07 0,0429 7,17 8,93 9,68 0 0 6,98 0
Bank of 
America 2007 0,1276 231,93 526,5 0,0101 735,28 0,0402 7,06 8,53 9,4 0 0 6,46 0
Bank of 
America 2008 0,2168 185,95 520,24 0,0015 698,82 0,0577 4,43 5,11 5,33 0,00002 0 3,67 0,0123
Bank of 
America 2009 0,9962 39,62 594,29 -0,0012 623,9 0,0862 0,55 0,51 0,54 30,6087929,50805 -0,46 67,73306
Bank of 
America 2010 1,2246 168,74 574,16 -0,0016 689,12 0,4026 0,41 0,25 0,26 40,2059239,91966 0,04 48,36784
Bank of 
America 2011 0,3664 142,2 485,4 0 627,33 0,0831 2,72 3,04 3,05 0,11675 0,11426 2,04 2,06305
Bank of 
America 2012 0,5748 105,39 489,38 0,0013 593,62 0,1051 1,67 1,8 1,79 3,6138 3,64524 1 15,77097
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Bank of New 
York 2004 0,2771 24,25 4,8 0,0156 28,98 0,2319 3,6 7,71 7,7 0 0 7,35 0
Bank of New 
York 2005 0,2026 22,53 5,6 0,0166 27,96 0,1633 4,9 9,86 9,96 0 0 9,35 0
Bank of New 
York 2006 0,1759 26,95 6,8 0,0145 33,43 0,1418 5,62 11,26 11,5 0 0 10,67 0
Bank of New 
York 2007 0,2044 30,85 16,55 0,0215 46,67 0,1351 4,78 7,77 7,94 0 0 7,15 0
Bank of New 
York 2008 0,2669 50,25 16,4 0,0071 66,43 0,2019 3,73 6,86 6,9 0 0 6,45 0
Bank of New 
York 2009 0,8931 29,93 13,38 -0,0058 43,11 0,6294 1,1 1,54 1,55 6,23554 6,0939 1,4 8,03364
Bank of New 
York 2010 0,6796 37,07 17,38 0,0119 54,4 0,4649 1,46 2,25 2,23 1,22948 1,30352 2,07 1,93003
Bank of New 
York 2011 0,2675 36,34 20,14 0,01 56,47 0,1721 3,74 5,96 5,91 0 0 5,48 0
Bank of New 
York 2012 0,3846 28,77 19,21 0,0074 47,96 0,2307 2,6 3,88 3,85 0,00516 0,0058 3,52 0,02147
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Citigroup 2004 0,2429 259,6 388,59 0,0134 642,83 0,0981 4,03 5,22 5,22 0,00001 0,00001 4,37 0,00062
Citigroup 2005 0,1564 237,48 403,82 0,0133 628,54 0,0591 6,05 7,68 8 0 0 6,27 0
Citigroup 2006 0,1218 235,69 553,2 0,0142 762,7 0,0376 7,3 8,89 9,8 0 0 6,68 0
Citigroup 2007 0,1415 255,08 647,54 0,0019 874,15 0,0413 6,28 7,29 8,33 0 0 5,27 0,00001
Citigroup 2008 0,2921 112,08 534,06 -0,0134 638,57 0,0513 3,19 3,2 3,74 0,06904 0,00927 1,57 5,7924
Citigroup 2009 1,1293 14,35 402,91 -0,0048 409,65 0,0633 0,26 0,15 0,25 43,8537639,95101 -1,16 87,7457
Citigroup 2010 1,2743 111,38 466,19 0,0057 529 0,3832 0,31 0,15 0,14 43,9154844,36018 -0,06 52,57121
Citigroup 2011 0,3794 129,07 423,68 0,0056 552,51 0,0887 2,63 3,01 2,95 0,13043 0,15713 2,07 1,91885
Citigroup 2012 0,5279 110,78 376,42 0,004 486,54 0,122 1,85 2,07 2,05 1,90026 2,02178 1,39 8,20426
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
JP Morgan 2004 0,2985 85,06 210,21 0,0057 292,37 0,0868 3,24 3,82 3,92 0,00663 0,0045 2,86 0,21098
JP Morgan 2005 0,1729 127,19 218,37 0,0073 338,66 0,0649 5,47 6,84 7,22 0 0 5,55 0
JP Morgan 2006 0,1376 143,6 286,03 0,0114 416,09 0,0475 6,58 8,11 8,89 0 0 6,35 0
JP Morgan 2007 0,1672 170,37 307,47 0,0114 464,32 0,0613 5,51 6,88 7,42 0 0 5,52 0
JP Morgan 2008 0,2627 156,14 449,95 0,0019 599,71 0,0684 3,65 4,19 4,38 0,00137 0,00061 2,98 0,14632
JP Morgan 2009 0,8394 87 494,57 0,004 574,72 0,1467 0,95 0,98 0,96 16,4138 16,83422 0,41 34,1164
JP Morgan 2010 0,7976 172,69 493,13 0,0078 659,02 0,2276 1,11 1,19 1,17 11,6126412,17313 0,83 20,37784
JP Morgan 2011 0,3055 181,99 443,02 0,0083 624,78 0,089 3,27 3,91 3,82 0,00459 0,00656 2,97 0,14676
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JP Morgan 2012 0,3994 172,47 462,29 0,0088 634,32 0,1088 2,49 2,94 2,86 0,16659 0,21011 2,17 1,50528
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
PNC Bank 2004 0,1997 15,55 9,16 0,0175 24,58 0,1263 4,97 7,89 7,86 0 0 7,23 0
PNC Bank 2005 0,1493 14,26 13,5 0,0166 27,33 0,0779 6,5 9,23 9,43 0 0 8,16 0
PNC Bank 2006 0,1501 20,58 11,72 0,0282 31,74 0,0973 6,48 10,48 10,69 0 0 9,63 0
PNC Bank 2007 0,165 25,01 29,51 0,0144 53,22 0,0776 5,75 7,75 8,15 0 0 6,68 0
PNC Bank 2008 0,2556 23,45 35,42 0,0061 58,36 0,1027 3,83 4,87 4,95 0,00006 0,00004 4,06 0,00246
PNC Bank 2009 0,6626 14,11 26,11 0,0068 40,06 0,2401 1,45 1,69 1,67 4,53057 4,74379 1,34 8,93269
PNC Bank 2010 1,0502 30,98 27,08 0,0111 56,74 0,6131 0,85 0,92 0,9 17,93918 18,3572 0,78 21,71968
PNC Bank 2011 0,3282 32,27 26,25 0,0112 58,51 0,181 3,05 4,4 4,34 0,00054 0,00071 3,94 0,0041
PNC Bank 2012 0,35 33,43 31,28 0,0103 64,68 0,1809 2,85 3,98 3,93 0,00341 0,00424 3,52 0,02145
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Wells Fargo 2004 0,1784 97,82 66,05 0,0181 162,95 0,1071 5,55 8,55 8,51 0 0 7,77 0
Wells Fargo 2005 0,1219 100,37 69,29 0,0179 167,47 0,0731 8,02 12,29 12,48 0 0 11,14 0
Wells Fargo 2006 0,1215 108,73 63,77 0,0176 169,49 0,078 8 12,72 13,12 0 0 11,65 0
Wells Fargo 2007 0,1291 119,87 112,15 0,0167 227,09 0,0682 7,43 10,56 10,98 0 0 9,34 0
Wells Fargo 2008 0,266 107,31 268,6 0,0041 372,11 0,0767 3,63 4,26 4,4 0,001 0,00055 3,18 0,07423
Wells Fargo 2009 0,8123 59,29 161,14 0,0062 217,95 0,2412 1,08 1,16 1,14 12,3648112,76503 0,81 20,86057
Wells Fargo 2010 1,0338 157,62 152 0,0094 302,53 0,5787 0,86 0,92 0,9 17,9795418,34513 0,77 22,0037
Wells Fargo 2011 0,3366 168,31 121,07 0,0119 289,32 0,1958 2,97 4,41 4,35 0,00051 0,00067 3,99 0,00336
Wells Fargo 2012 0,3853 179,55 128,84 0,0137 308,28 0,2244 2,59 3,84 3,78 0,00625 0,00787 3,46 0,02655
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
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Table 16: USA - not defaulted - non financial firms
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Airgas 2004 0,3074 1,49 0,35 0,0425 1,83 0,2499 3,24 6,7 6,58 0 0
Airgas 2005 0,2552 1,84 0,41 0,0412 2,24 0,2102 3,89 8,2 8,15 0 0
Airgas 2006 0,2654 2,93 0,49 0,0543 3,4 0,229 3,74 8,58 8,55 0 0
Airgas 2007 0,2732 3,26 0,75 0,0561 3,98 0,2239 3,62 7,58 7,53 0 0
Airgas 2008 0,2697 3,74 0,87 0,0586 4,59 0,2195 3,7 7,75 7,55 0 0
Airgas 2009 0,6829 2,65 0,93 0,0597 3,57 0,5068 1,46 2,52 2,41 0,58179 0,80155
Airgas 2010 0,3837 5,29 0,81 0,0442 6,09 0,3329 2,61 6,03 5,91 0 0
Airgas 2011 0,3964 5,28 1 0,0515 6,28 0,3335 2,52 5,51 5,35 0 0
Airgas 2012 0,2507 6,59 1,35 0,0607 7,94 0,208 3,99 8,7 8,41 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Caterpillar 2004 0,2742 26,24 15,61 0,0568 41,63 0,1729 3,62 5,92 5,67 0 0
Caterpillar 2005 0,2348 32,09 17,91 0,0673 49,43 0,1524 4,18 7,03 6,8 0 0
Caterpillar 2006 0,2534 50,65 18,46 0,0764 68,23 0,1881 3,88 7,26 7,11 0 0
Caterpillar 2007 0,2866 43,19 19,51 0,0724 61,85 0,2001 3,42 6,03 5,89 0 0
Caterpillar 2008 0,23 47,44 24,12 0,0652 71,22 0,1532 4,32 7,42 7,08 0 0
Caterpillar 2009 0,5038 17,75 20,71 0,0139 38,41 0,2334 1,97 2,59 2,54 0,47936 0,55846
Caterpillar 2010 0,5205 38,77 18,2 0,0471 56,94 0,3545 1,92 3,17 3,04 0,07534 0,11657
Caterpillar 2011 0,3182 69,23 22,12 0,0801 91,34 0,2412 3,14 6,09 5,76 0 0
Caterpillar 2012 0,3726 69,82 26,27 0,0716 96,07 0,2708 2,68 4,92 4,66 0,00004 0,00016
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Generale Electric 2004 0,2413 294,2 264,33 0,0256 554,87 0,128 4,09 5,93 5,84 0 0
Generale Electric 2005 0,1659 378,74 264,3 0,0218 634,68 0,099 5,89 9,02 9,12 0 0
Generale Electric 2006 0,1355 353,88 302,56 0,0307 642,11 0,0747 7,08 10,45 10,69 0 0
Generale Electric 2007 0,1257 368,34 354,61 0,0322 707,36 0,0655 7,62 11,01 11,2 0 0
Generale Electric 2008 0,1822 373,46 358,73 0,0227 727,11 0,0936 5,41 7,75 7,66 0 0
Generale Electric 2009 0,5532 109,51 321,62 0,0134 430,24 0,1433 1,76 2,05 1,97 2,00664 2,44465
Generale Electric 2010 0,5639 196,91 298,3 0,016 494,42 0,2267 1,75 2,19 2,12 1,44141 1,69461
Generale Electric 2011 0,2731 210,05 295,53 0,0174 505,42 0,1135 3,66 4,83 4,68 0,00007 0,00015
Generale Electric 2012 0,3023 209,25 257,73 0,0198 466,75 0,1355 3,3 4,46 4,32 0,00041 0,00078
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Grainger 2004 0,2526 4,11 0,01 0,1102 4,12 0,252 3,96 24,41 24,03 0 0
Grainger 2005 0,2077 5,74 0,01 0,1241 5,75 0,2075 4,81 32,81 32,37 0 0
Grainger 2006 0,2132 6,77 0,01 0,1235 6,78 0,213 4,69 32,73 32,38 0 0
Grainger 2007 0,2455 6,63 0,11 0,1402 6,74 0,2417 4,07 17,52 17,12 0 0
Grainger 2008 0,2212 6,29 0,29 0,1564 6,57 0,2117 4,52 15,45 14,78 0 0
Grainger 2009 0,4107 5,26 0,31 0,123 5,56 0,3881 2,43 7,59 7,28 0 0
Grainger 2010 0,2858 7,91 0,28 0,137 8,2 0,2759 3,5 12,55 12,05 0 0
Grainger 2011 0,2273 9,43 0,43 0,1692 9,85 0,2175 4,4 15,08 14,31 0 0
Grainger 2012 0,2775 15,09 0,33 0,1468 15,42 0,2715 3,6 14,55 14,01 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
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Hewlett Packard 2004 0,4022 65,97 4,82 0,0478 70,73 0,3752 2,48 7,1 7,01 0 0
Hewlett Packard 2005 0,2752 57,36 3,53 0,0319 60,78 0,2597 3,63 10,96 10,96 0 0
Hewlett Packard 2006 0,2666 93,82 3,95 0,0834 97,58 0,2563 3,74 12,71 12,57 0 0
Hewlett Packard 2007 0,257 108,21 5,68 0,0918 113,64 0,2447 3,88 12,49 12,3 0 0
Hewlett Packard 2008 0,2193 118,16 14,01 0,0941 131,98 0,1964 4,55 11,8 11,4 0 0
Hewlett Packard 2009 0,4581 73,48 8,66 0,0699 82,12 0,4099 2,18 5,45 5,29 0 0,00001
Hewlett Packard 2010 0,3432 124,43 14,34 0,0771 138,75 0,3078 2,91 7,47 7,22 0 0
Hewlett Packard 2011 0,2485 93,27 19,09 0,059 112,34 0,2063 4,02 8,77 8,49 0 0
Hewlett Packard 2012 0,418 46,72 17,34 -0,1011 64,05 0,3049 2,39 3,8 4,14 0,0072 0,00177
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
IBM 2004 0,2332 155,7 15,51 0,0841 171 0,2123 4,28 11,6 11,26 0 0
IBM 2005 0,1481 146,14 14,93 0,0747 160,59 0,1348 6,73 18,11 17,8 0 0
IBM 2006 0,1784 131,36 15,79 0,0906 146,4 0,1601 5,57 14,4 14,13 0 0
IBM 2007 0,1401 143,57 23,75 0,1049 166,28 0,121 7,08 16,89 16,39 0 0
IBM 2008 0,2018 163,81 22,58 0,1037 186,07 0,1777 4,95 12,36 11,86 0 0
IBM 2009 0,3596 124,12 15,13 0,1313 139,23 0,3206 2,78 7,17 6,77 0 0
IBM 2010 0,2744 165,9 17,7 0,1415 183,57 0,248 3,64 9,88 9,31 0 0
IBM 2011 0,1789 192,3 19,89 0,1438 212,18 0,1621 5,59 15,41 14,53 0 0
IBM 2012 0,2233 237,17 21,25 0,147 258,4 0,2049 4,48 12,8 12,09 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Intel 2004 0,3665 171,76 0,55 0,1594 172,31 0,3653 2,73 15,97 15,58 0 0
Intel 2005 0,3034 146,38 1,37 0,18 147,7 0,3007 3,29 16,02 15,53 0 0
Intel 2006 0,2036 116,37 1,1 0,1045 117,42 0,2018 4,91 23,54 23,27 0 0
Intel 2007 0,2698 111,53 1,13 0,1447 112,62 0,2672 3,71 17,62 17,25 0 0
Intel 2008 0,258 125,89 1,04 0,0956 126,92 0,2559 3,88 19 18,68 0 0
Intel 2009 0,5306 81,48 1,2 0,0875 82,68 0,5229 1,88 8,01 7,84 0 0
Intel 2010 0,3676 121,49 1,08 0,2171 122,56 0,3643 2,72 13,41 12,82 0 0
Intel 2011 0,253 108,73 3,79 0,2058 112,51 0,2445 3,95 14,59 13,75 0 0
Intel 2012 0,2689 139,09 6,88 0,1555 145,97 0,2562 3,72 12,4 11,8 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Nike 2004 0,2507 14,26 0,49 0,1293 14,75 0,2424 3,99 14,42 13,95 0 0
Nike 2005 0,1861 15,94 0,42 0,1449 16,35 0,1815 5,37 20,88 20,26 0 0
Nike 2006 0,198 16,74 0,5 0,1516 17,22 0,1925 5,04 19,03 18,5 0 0
Nike 2007 0,1519 20,51 0,34 0,1517 20,83 0,1495 6,58 28,54 27,82 0 0
Nike 2008 0,2159 26,78 0,4 0,1676 27,18 0,2128 4,63 20,46 19,74 0 0
Nike 2009 0,4897 17,72 0,59 0,1213 18,32 0,4738 2,04 7,26 7 0 0
Nike 2010 0,3591 29,17 0,37 0,1497 29,53 0,3546 2,78 12,61 12,19 0 0
Nike 2011 0,2164 29,48 0,53 0,1577 30 0,2126 4,62 19,66 18,93 0 0
Nike 2012 0,3038 39,57 0,27 0,1598 39,84 0,3017 3,29 16,92 16,39 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Procter & Gamble 2004 0,1351 134,45 14,56 0,1203 148,81 0,1221 7,39 19,97 19,09 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
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Procter & Gamble 2005 0,1454 133,04 17,88 0,1151 150,36 0,1286 6,85 17,38 16,74 0 0
Procter & Gamble 2006 0,1451 194,16 20,12 0,0625 213,32 0,132 6,86 18,29 18,19 0 0
Procter & Gamble 2007 0,1324 198,66 23,73 0,0753 221,35 0,1189 7,51 19,36 19,11 0 0
Procter & Gamble 2008 0,1419 213,49 24,87 0,0836 238,01 0,1273 7,03 18,33 17,79 0 0
Procter & Gamble 2009 0,3066 133,62 26,65 0,0812 160,22 0,2557 3,26 7,21 6,89 0 0
Procter & Gamble 2010 0,2455 185,43 19,15 0,0824 204,55 0,2225 4,07 10,9 10,54 0 0
Procter & Gamble 2011 0,1342 171,69 21 0,0879 192,67 0,1196 7,45 19,21 18,48 0 0
Procter & Gamble 2012 0,1493 185,1 19,24 0,0695 204,32 0,1352 6,7 17,92 17,41 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Tesoro Corporation 2004 0,4848 1,17 0,61 0,0896 1,77 0,32 2,05 3,45 3,21 0,02837 0,06632
Tesoro Corporation 2005 0,486 2,41 0,53 0,1244 2,92 0,4014 2,04 4,38 4,15 0,00058 0,00164
Tesoro Corporation 2006 0,4665 4,48 0,53 0,1572 4,99 0,4192 2,13 5,51 5,25 0 0,00001
Tesoro Corporation 2007 0,3313 6,88 0,83 0,0959 7,67 0,2971 3 7,66 7,49 0 0
Tesoro Corporation 2008 0,4361 4,18 0,81 0,0342 4,98 0,3665 2,29 4,88 4,82 0,00005 0,00007
Tesoro Corporation 2009 0,9521 2,02 0,92 -0,0188 2,92 0,6711 1,02 1,35 1,38 8,80471 8,33063
Tesoro Corporation 2010 0,6015 2,01 1,07 -0,0036 3,08 0,3931 1,66 2,48 2,49 0,66458 0,64136
Tesoro Corporation 2011 0,3794 3,73 1,06 0,0625 4,79 0,2955 2,64 5,17 4,96 0,00001 0,00004
Tesoro Corporation 2012 0,5602 4,01 0,8 0,0751 4,81 0,4675 1,78 3,77 3,61 0,00808 0,01508
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Wesco International 2004 0,5689 0,63 0,22 0,0559 0,85 0,4214 1,75 3,09 2,99 0,10006 0,1393
Wesco International 2005 0,3976 1,35 0,23 0,0763 1,58 0,3413 2,5 5,68 5,55 0 0
Wesco International 2006 0,3642 2,94 0,8 0,1316 3,7 0,2895 2,71 5,61 5,33 0 0,00001
Wesco International 2007 0,405 3,13 0,97 0,0852 4,06 0,3125 2,44 4,7 4,57 0,00013 0,00024
Wesco International 2008 0,3492 1,53 0,75 0,0744 2,27 0,2356 2,84 4,9 4,65 0,00005 0,00017
Wesco International 2009 0,6759 0,68 0,43 0,0389 1,1 0,4194 1,47 2,16 2,07 1,54411 1,92507
Wesco International 2010 0,5694 1,46 0,39 0,0469 1,86 0,4486 1,76 3,33 3,23 0,0431 0,06177
Wesco International 2011 0,3387 2,62 0,38 0,0703 3 0,2963 2,95 7,1 6,87 0 0
Wesco International 2012 0,4429 2,86 0,93 0,0659 3,78 0,3345 2,26 4,23 4,04 0,00115 0,00268
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Whirpool 2004 0,2834 4,67 0,83 0,0572 5,49 0,2411 3,52 7,95 7,77 0 0
Whirpool 2005 0,2309 4,45 0,87 0,0537 5,29 0,1942 4,3 9,49 9,38 0 0
Whirpool 2006 0,2705 5,91 1,44 0,0625 7,28 0,2196 3,65 7,56 7,5 0 0
Whirpool 2007 0,2553 6,95 1,26 0,0484 8,15 0,2176 3,89 8,7 8,68 0 0
Whirpool 2008 0,3062 6,73 1,6 0,0298 8,3 0,2482 3,25 6,64 6,58 0 0
Whirpool 2009 0,5819 1,89 1,65 0,0242 3,54 0,3125 1,71 2,36 2,29 0,91424 1,10909
Whirpool 2010 0,6639 6,46 1,41 0,041 7,87 0,5453 1,51 2,96 2,88 0,15629 0,19731
Whirpool 2011 0,4043 6,16 1,43 0,0273 7,58 0,3283 2,47 5,01 4,93 0,00003 0,00004
Whirpool 2012 0,3897 5,96 1,49 0,0302 7,45 0,3119 2,57 5,1 5,01 0,00002 0,00003
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
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Table 17: EU - not defaulted - financial firms
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Banco Bilbao 2004 0,3353 35,84 112,51 0,0099 146 0,0823 2,79 3,24 3,38 0,05896 0,03626 2,23 1,28365
Banco Bilbao 2005 0,1856 41,71 127,84 0,0124 166,78 0,0464 5,03 5,97 6,18 0 0 4,18 0,00148
Banco Bilbao 2006 0,1309 57,64 124,46 0,0123 178,33 0,0423 7,14 8,77 9,21 0 0 6,8 0
Banco Bilbao 2007 0,1786 64,5 157,89 0,0151 215,78 0,0534 5,02 6,11 6,62 0 0 4,54 0,00028
Banco Bilbao 2008 0,208 50,6 145,13 0,0101 189,16 0,0556 4,18 4,92 5,57 0,00004 0 3,42 0,03161
Banco Bilbao 2009 0,5066 22,23 140,82 0,0078 161,25 0,0711 1,78 1,98 2,04 2,37914 2,04564 0,81 20,96844
Banco Bilbao 2010 0,4342 38,72 148,05 0,0088 185,54 0,091 2,22 2,53 2,52 0,5667 0,57925 1,62 5,30547
Banco Bilbao 2011 0,4306 39,74 161,65 0,0056 199,14 0,0863 2,18 2,44 2,53 0,73865 0,56377 1,47 7,0515
Banco Bilbao 2012 0,4279 31,8 185,09 0,0028 215,81 0,0634 2,25 2,43 2,48 0,74521 0,65609 1,12 13,14681
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
BNP Paribas 2004 0,3357 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
BNP Paribas 2005 0,1791 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
BNP Paribas 2006 0,1641 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
BNP Paribas 2007 0,2156 72,58 268,08 0,0053 329,43 0,0475 3,92 4,43 5,22 0,00048 0,00001 2,67 0,37839
BNP Paribas 2008 0,2659 55,71 272,94 0,0016 316,3 0,0468 2,93 3,16 4,11 0,07907 0,00195 1,38 8,39933
BNP Paribas 2009 0,6186 28,87 346,15 0,0027 370,32 0,0511 1,28 1,35 1,54 8,87594 6,2231 -0,28 61,15602
BNP Paribas 2010 0,6222 67,94 245,89 0,0037 311,19 0,1409 1,49 1,63 1,66 5,18481 4,86164 1,04 15,02341
BNP Paribas 2011 0,4186 63,74 207,31 0,0029 268,17 0,0998 2,27 2,56 2,67 0,52559 0,38067 1,72 4,24445
BNP Paribas 2012 0,5971 45,89 148,28 0,0032 193,02 0,146 1,59 1,75 1,77 3,96376 3,81948 1,18 11,82437
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
HSBC 2004 0,1914 89,99 135,82 0,0111 222,98 0,0772 5,06 6,52 6,65 0 0 5,44 0
HSBC 2005 0,1429 94,14 138,51 0,0125 229,64 0,0586 6,78 8,82 8,98 0 0 7,39 0
HSBC 2006 0,1014 112,21 154,84 0,0097 262,35 0,0434 9,45 12,36 12,85 0 0 10,44 0
HSBC 2007 0,1366 102,07 180,92 0,01 275,41 0,0506 6,78 8,47 9,12 0 0 6,82 0
HSBC 2008 0,1734 95,7 211,2 0,0025 297,35 0,0558 5,19 6,15 6,93 0 0 4,65 0,00016
HSBC 2009 0,4474 63,83 169,9 0,0021 231,62 0,1238 2,15 2,46 2,54 0,69751 0,55276 1,78 3,71379
HSBC 2010 0,5461 118,48 171,85 0,0057 288,78 0,2257 1,79 2,21 2,22 1,34753 1,31124 1,84 3,26818
HSBC 2011 0,2241 112,23 164,41 0,0064 274,36 0,0917 4,37 5,61 5,69 0 0 4,7 0,00013
HSBC 2012 0,2788 102,16 149,4 0,0052 250,71 0,1136 3,56 4,55 4,55 0,00027 0,00027 3,81 0,0069
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Mediobanca 2004 0,2682 7,58 15,47 0,0149 22,73 0,0894 3,57 4,42 4,49 0,00049 0,00035 3,49 0,02424
Mediobanca 2005 0,1637 10,23 16,57 0,0144 26,44 0,0633 5,9 7,58 7,69 0 0 6,26 0
Mediobanca 2006 0,2168 14,66 18,78 0,0193 32,87 0,0967 4,43 5,94 6,06 0 0 5,08 0,00002
Mediobanca 2007 0,2054 13,39 26,7 0,0181 38,98 0,0706 4,46 5,58 5,93 0 0 4,4 0,00055
Mediobanca 2008 0,193 9,95 25,34 0,0174 34,14 0,0563 4,58 5,58 6,1 0 0 4,1 0,00206
Mediobanca 2009 0,3115 4,73 29,26 0 33,64 0,0438 2,97 3,16 3,44 0,08004 0,02948 1,25 10,49983
Mediobanca 2010 0,3759 6,97 28,8 0,0054 35,54 0,0739 2,57 2,88 2,92 0,19654 0,17489 1,75 3,96526
Mediobanca 2011 0,3383 6,31 26,89 0,0049 32,83 0,0651 2,78 3,11 3,25 0,09337 0,05793 1,83 3,36981
Mediobanca 2012 0,3991 4,16 24,03 0,0011 28,06 0,0594 2,41 2,6 2,67 0,47293 0,37646 1,19 11,68596
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
! PDrf
! PDµ
! PDrf
! PDµ
! PDrf
! PDµ
!σ V " DC
! PDµ
!σ V " DC
! PDµ
!σ V
!σ E ! DDKMV
" DC
! PDC
!σ V
!σ E ! DDKMV ! PDC
" DC
!σ V
!σ E ! DDKMV ! PDC
! DDrf
" DC
!σ E ! DDKMV ! PDC
! DDrf
!σ E ! DDKMV ! PDC
! DDrf
! DDµ
! DDrf
! DDµ
! DDrf
! DDµ
! PDrf
! DDµ
! PDrf
! DDµ
!107
Summary statistics
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
Societe 
Generale 2004 0,3412 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Societe 
Generale 2005 0,1948 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Societe 
Generale 2006 0,1625 54,1 162,36 0,0061 211,54 0,0416 5,6 6,49 7,09 0 0 4,49 0,00036
Societe 
Generale 2007 0,2217 58,23 168,8 0,0009 219,95 0,0587 3,96 4,5 5,21 0,00035 0,00001 3,08 0,10498
Societe 
Generale 2008 0,2887 35,77 147,04 0,0017 176,16 0,0586 2,82 3,08 3,84 0,10311 0,00611 1,66 4,85476
Societe 
Generale 2009 0,7101 16,98 88,48 0,0002 103,93 0,1254 1,19 1,22 1,32 11,07871 9,36066 0,56 28,86751
Societe 
Generale 2010 0,5917 33,29 88,66 0,0035 121,06 0,1665 1,61 1,81 1,84 3,52667 3,31714 1,31 9,55005
Societe 
Generale 2011 0,4927 35,92 133,64 0,0021 167,65 0,1067 1,9 2,09 2,2 1,82316 1,38209 1,31 9,50761
Societe 
Generale 2012 0,6859 18,78 125,04 0,0004 142,64 0,0973 1,27 1,31 1,36 9,52013 8,63051 0,45 32,55046
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Unicredit 2004 0,2412 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Unicredit 2005 0,1279 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Unicredit 2006 0,1784 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Unicredit 2007 0,2041 70,88 278,78 0,0073 337,98 0,0428 4,09 4,65 5,48 0,00017 0 2,7 0,3463
Unicredit 2008 0,2633 55,18 243,84 0,004 287,99 0,0505 3,04 3,35 4,19 0,04006 0,00139 1,7 4,45984
Unicredit 2009 0,6674 17,45 211,95 0,0016 226,37 0,0557 1,14 1,18 1,37 11,85281 8,46547 -0,31 62,33158
Unicredit 2010 0,6242 40,99 189,71 0,0013 228,69 0,1168 1,46 1,55 1,61 6,02236 5,35772 0,84 20,0723
Unicredit 2011 0,4277 34,08 171,75 -0,0102 203,44 0,072 2,16 2,17 2,51 1,48696 0,60661 1,02 15,49479
Unicredit 2012 0,6361 23,17 225,58 0,0009 247,05 0,0635 1,37 1,41 1,49 7,85602 6,80546 0,1 45,96526
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
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Summary statistics
Table 18: EU - not defaulted - non financial firms
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Adidas 2004 0,2626 4,31 0,63 0,0784 4,92 0,2298 3,8 9,19 8,94 0 0
Adidas 2005 0,1889 5,43 0,52 0,1 5,94 0,1726 5,28 14,56 14,1 0 0
Adidas 2006 0,2011 8,35 1,29 0,0869 9,61 0,1749 4,95 11,88 11,55 0 0
Adidas 2007 0,2153 7,94 1,08 0,0685 8,97 0,1906 4,62 11,39 11,25 0 0
Adidas 2008 0,2154 7,97 1,69 0,0801 9,58 0,1792 4,6 10,05 9,86 0 0
Adidas 2009 0,4914 4,62 0,98 0,0267 5,59 0,4059 2,03 4,14 4,11 0,00172 0,00201
Adidas 2010 0,36 8,18 0,94 0,067 9,12 0,323 2,77 7,06 6,88 0 0
Adidas 2011 0,258 9,26 0,79 0,0664 10,04 0,238 3,87 10,84 10,62 0 0
Adidas 2012 0,3195 12,1 0,9 0,0483 12,99 0,2976 3,13 9 8,86 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2004 0,2916 9,71 3,28 0,0665 12,92 0,2191 3,41 6,45 6,24 0 0
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2005 0,1939 15,19 3,46 0,0506 18,58 0,1585 5,13 10,83 10,65 0 0
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2006 0,192 23,82 3,87 0,0623 27,57 0,1658 5,18 12,14 11,95 0 0
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2007 0,2097 33,45 4,11 0,0866 37,39 0,1876 4,74 12,13 11,9 0 0
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2008 0,2717 34,87 25,92 0,0459 59,62 0,1589 3,56 5,45 5,45 0 0
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2009 0,628 32,07 17,85 0,041 49,68 0,4066 1,58 2,42 2,34 0,78575 0,95165
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2010 0,4067 61,08 17,86 0,0392 78,8 0,3153 2,45 4,67 4,58 0,00015 0,00024
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2011 0,2437 63,75 17,65 0,0494 81,16 0,1914 4,09 8,13 7,95 0 0
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2012 0,2224 88,34 18,85 0,065 107,08 0,1834 4,49 9,73 9,41 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Bp 2004 0,2427 100 8,67 0,0861 108,49 0,2237 4,11 11,57 11,28 0 0
Bp 2005 0,179 121,44 8,18 0,1237 129,44 0,1679 5,58 17,1 16,5 0 0
Bp 2006 0,1858 133,88 9,44 0,0983 143,03 0,1739 5,37 16,11 15,72 0 0
Bp 2007 0,1876 100,09 11,7 0,0934 111,31 0,1687 5,3 13,82 13,52 0 0
Bp 2008 0,199 93,63 16,76 0,0965 109,64 0,1699 4,99 11,54 11,24 0 0
Bp 2009 0,4505 86,86 13,67 0,068 100,36 0,3899 2,22 5,09 4,95 0,00002 0,00004
Bp 2010 0,2774 119,22 19,22 -0,0164 138,29 0,2391 3,6 8,06 8,17 0 0
Bp 2011 0,3678 87,34 17,15 0,0917 104,25 0,3081 2,71 6 5,75 0 0
Bp 2012 0,2714 91,4 18,09 0,0386 109,39 0,2268 3,68 7,99 7,85 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
ENI 2004 0,2311 65,45 8,99 0,1112 74,25 0,2037 4,32 10,81 10,37 0 0
ENI 2005 0,1635 80,49 9,17 0,131 89,46 0,1471 6,1 16,3 15,55 0 0
ENI 2006 0,1765 93,08 7,99 0,1124 100,84 0,1629 5,65 16,16 15,66 0 0
ENI 2007 0,1575 92,88 14,16 0,1156 106,46 0,1374 6,31 15,45 14,92 0 0
ENI 2008 0,1884 83,59 13,87 0,0886 96,84 0,1627 5,27 12,41 12,15 0 0
ENI 2009 0,5034 57,24 15,77 0,0384 72,81 0,3957 1,98 3,77 3,7 0,00832 0,01082
ENI 2010 0,3256 68,45 17,63 0,0554 85,94 0,2593 3,06 6,19 6,01 0 0
ENI 2011 0,2262 67,41 18,05 0,054 85,21 0,179 4,4 8,89 8,66 0 0
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Summary statistics
ENI 2012 0,2974 73,06 14,82 0,0567 87,8 0,2475 3,36 7,29 7,09 0 0
Glaxosmithkline 2004 0,2748 63,84 3,77 0,2177 67,54 0,2598 3,63 11,81 11,06 0 0
Glaxosmithkline 2005 0,1952 72,24 3,84 0,2229 75,99 0,1855 5,12 17,2 16,12 0 0
Glaxosmithkline 2006 0,1739 89,41 3,1 0,2157 92,42 0,1682 5,74 21,37 20,27 0 0
Glaxosmithkline 2007 0,1617 81,27 7,04 0,2225 88,01 0,1493 6,16 18,33 17,13 0 0
Glaxosmithkline 2008 0,1856 58,47 8,57 0,1598 66,66 0,1628 5,35 13,5 12,8 0 0
Glaxosmithkline 2009 0,3537 52,64 8,86 0,151 61,39 0,3033 2,82 6,73 6,27 0 0
Glaxosmithkline 2010 0,2295 66,79 7,7 0,0404 74,42 0,206 4,35 11,11 10,95 0 0
Glaxosmithkline 2011 0,1906 59,86 8,8 0,1326 68,54 0,1665 5,24 13,04 12,33 0 0
Glaxosmithkline 2012 0,1907 71,89 10,97 0,1194 82,79 0,1655 5,24 12,85 12,16 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Luxottica 2004 0,3095 5,84 1,33 0,0733 7,14 0,2529 3,22 6,8 6,59 0 0
Luxottica 2005 0,2035 7,15 1,1 0,0751 8,22 0,1769 4,9 11,72 11,42 0 0
Luxottica 2006 0,1955 10,95 1,01 0,0866 11,92 0,1795 5,1 14,16 13,85 0 0
Luxottica 2007 0,2308 11,06 2,21 0,1001 13,18 0,1937 4,3 9,63 9,34 0 0
Luxottica 2008 0,2575 6,85 1,98 0,0536 8,74 0,2019 3,83 7,52 7,49 0 0
Luxottica 2009 0,4974 4,88 1,52 0,0436 6,37 0,3805 2 3,7 3,61 0,0109 0,01502
Luxottica 2010 0,3617 9,12 1,57 0,0571 10,68 0,3088 2,76 6,23 6,07 0 0
Luxottica 2011 0,2383 10,3 1,81 0,0593 12,09 0,203 4,19 9,53 9,31 0 0
Luxottica 2012 0,2674 12,79 1,43 0,0655 14,2 0,2407 3,74 9,7 9,45 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Maersk 2004 0,3132 103,75 27,88 0,1407 131,04 0,248 3,17 6,68 6,2 0 0
Maersk 2005 0,2749 121,33 52,89 0,1015 173,07 0,1927 3,6 6,58 6,17 0 0
Maersk 2006 0,2376 126,6 59,71 0,0543 184,5 0,163 4,15 7,17 7,03 0 0
Maersk 2007 0,2891 127,04 60,92 0,0593 185,41 0,1981 3,39 5,82 5,74 0 0
Maersk 2008 0,2705 104,62 59,09 0,0524 161,04 0,1757 3,6 5,92 5,88 0 0
Maersk 2009 0,5301 55,17 61,15 -0,0208 115,54 0,2541 1,85 2,3 2,43 1,08551 0,76397
Maersk 2010 0,4884 92,31 56,85 0,0779 148,7 0,3033 2,04 3,28 3,05 0,0528 0,11634
Maersk 2011 0,3291 111,65 61,36 0,041 172,16 0,2134 3,02 4,92 4,79 0,00004 0,00008
Maersk 2012 0,3138 94,33 62,01 0,0542 155,99 0,1897 3,18 5,05 4,8 0,00002 0,00008
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Novartis 2004 0,2433 145,5 6,26 0,1225 151,62 0,2335 4,11 14,06 13,63 0 0
Novartis 2005 0,1641 148,86 10,23 0,1279 158,87 0,1538 6,08 18,59 17,9 0 0
Novartis 2006 0,1301 190,83 8,51 0,1229 199,08 0,1247 7,68 26,21 25,47 0 0
Novartis 2007 0,1391 181,44 6,19 0,0998 187,37 0,1347 7,18 25,98 25,56 0 0
Novartis 2008 0,1536 129,57 6,62 0,1086 135,89 0,1465 6,49 21,3 20,87 0 0
Novartis 2009 0,3548 113,36 9,98 0,1168 123,22 0,3264 2,82 7,89 7,57 0 0
Novartis 2010 0,2064 153,64 16,38 0,1082 169,89 0,1866 4,84 13,02 12,48 0 0
Novartis 2011 0,1654 129,74 12,48 0,0654 142,05 0,1511 6,04 16,46 16,11 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
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Novartis 2012 0,2152 138,52 11,61 0,0847 150,06 0,1986 4,64 13,21 12,81 0 0
Riotinto 2004 0,2851 14,37 1,29 0,1135 15,63 0,2621 3,5 9,82 9,47 0 0
Riotinto 2005 0,2394 19,21 1,51 0,215 20,69 0,2223 4,17 12,63 11,76 0 0
Riotinto 2006 0,246 28,83 1,28 0,2312 30,07 0,2358 4,06 14,24 13,39 0 0
Riotinto 2007 0,3412 28,42 13,87 0,208 41,71 0,2325 2,87 5,51 4,8 0 0,00008
Riotinto 2008 0,447 47,89 17,28 0,0389 64,39 0,3325 2,2 3,91 3,93 0,00467 0,00426
Riotinto 2009 0,9258 20,25 7,41 0,0507 27,47 0,6908 1,06 1,63 1,57 5,20487 5,82407
Riotinto 2010 0,6556 55,96 4,94 0,1577 60,86 0,6028 1,52 4,13 3,88 0,00184 0,00526
Riotinto 2011 0,3743 61,55 7,33 0,0515 68,78 0,3349 2,67 6,67 6,56 0 0
Riotinto 2012 0,3974 48,51 8,88 -0,0247 57,34 0,3362 2,51 5,31 5,4 0,00001 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Roche 2004 0,2793 87,64 5,49 0,1134 93,02 0,2631 3,58 11,06 10,71 0 0
Roche 2005 0,1826 89,72 5,01 0,1017 94,62 0,1731 5,47 17,47 17,01 0 0
Roche 2006 0,1833 140,86 5,14 0,1162 145,85 0,1771 5,45 19,46 18,98 0 0
Roche 2007 0,162 153,16 4,95 0,1347 157,9 0,1571 6,17 22,82 22,24 0 0
Roche 2008 0,1718 131,03 2,6 0,1167 133,51 0,1686 5,82 23,96 23,55 0 0
Roche 2009 0,3695 101,87 24,34 0,1048 125,92 0,2989 2,7 5,7 5,39 0 0
Roche 2010 0,2724 123,65 16,13 0,1204 139,65 0,2412 3,67 9,33 8,86 0 0
Roche 2011 0,1855 89,44 15,12 0,1593 104,35 0,159 5,38 13,07 12,16 0 0
Roche 2012 0,219 112,41 15,66 0,1622 127,98 0,1923 4,56 11,67 10,86 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Royal Dutch Shell 2004 0,2394 34,97 5,27 0,105 40,14 0,2086 4,16 10,13 9,73 0 0
Royal Dutch Shell 2005 0,1953 46,64 5,31 0,1404 51,84 0,1757 5,11 13,68 13 0 0
Royal Dutch Shell 2006 0,1745 49,92 5,58 0,1084 55,33 0,1574 5,71 15,18 14,69 0 0
Royal Dutch Shell 2007 0,1748 44,7 6,01 0,1315 50,46 0,1549 5,69 14,51 13,94 0 0
Royal Dutch Shell 2008 0,212 44,09 11,22 0,1063 54,81 0,1705 4,66 9,84 9,49 0 0
Royal Dutch Shell 2009 0,483 40,95 12,13 0,0417 52,93 0,3737 2,06 3,87 3,79 0,00551 0,00759
Royal Dutch Shell 2010 0,297 50,01 17,4 0,0733 67,26 0,2208 3,36 6,35 6,05 0 0
Royal Dutch Shell 2011 0,2124 58,71 14,13 0,0945 72,65 0,1717 4,69 10 9,53 0 0
Royal Dutch Shell 2012 0,2495 60,11 14,02 0,0761 74,05 0,2026 4 8,49 8,14 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Saab 2004 0,2652 10,36 2,23 0,0394 12,55 0,2189 3,75 7,95 7,87 0 0
Saab 2005 0,1807 11,71 1,88 0,0456 13,54 0,1562 5,52 12,87 12,72 0 0
Saab 2006 0,1768 19,32 1,69 0,0429 20,97 0,1629 5,64 15,63 15,55 0 0
Saab 2007 0,247 19,17 3,85 0,0593 22,86 0,2071 4,02 8,78 8,7 0 0
Saab 2008 0,2485 15,4 3,88 -0,0075 19,1 0,2004 3,98 7,82 8,09 0 0
Saab 2009 0,4976 5,82 3,08 0,0214 8,86 0,3268 2 3,13 3,11 0,08621 0,09476
Saab 2010 0,5352 11,45 1,15 0,0144 12,59 0,4868 1,87 4,71 4,69 0,00013 0,00013
Saab 2011 0,343 14,36 1,13 0,076 15,47 0,3183 2,91 8,3 8,11 0 0
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Saab 2012 0,3322 13,32 1,69 0,0493 15 0,295 3,01 7,42 7,27 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Siemens 2004 0,3641 52,56 6,33 0,0478 58,76 0,3257 2,74 6,83 6,74 0 0
Siemens 2005 0,2128 54,41 8,22 0,0415 62,45 0,1854 4,68 11,07 10,96 0 0
Siemens 2006 0,1605 68,01 8,87 0,038 76,61 0,1425 6,21 15,33 15,27 0 0
Siemens 2007 0,2125 72,19 10,57 0,0427 82,31 0,1864 4,68 11,15 11,15 0 0
Siemens 2008 0,2882 61,74 8,95 0,0192 70,28 0,2532 3,45 8,09 8,2 0 0
Siemens 2009 0,5692 39,73 10,17 0,0243 49,77 0,4544 1,75 3,32 3,3 0,0447 0,04912
Siemens 2010 0,4275 65,16 11,16 0,0421 76,23 0,3654 2,34 5,19 5,1 0,00001 0,00002
Siemens 2011 0,2613 84,93 10,8 0,0605 95,58 0,2322 3,82 9,54 9,34 0 0
Siemens 2012 0,2918 71,77 12,27 0,0434 83,97 0,2494 3,42 7,76 7,61 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Telefonica 2004 0,2745 61,4 16,87 0,0544 77,92 0,2163 3,62 7,22 7,06 0 0
Telefonica 2005 0,1838 66,85 21,77 0,082 88,15 0,1394 5,4 10,55 10,12 0 0
Telefonica 2006 0,1244 65,16 32,69 0,0716 96,85 0,0837 7,92 13,79 13,31 0 0
Telefonica 2007 0,1529 79,92 29,3 0,0888 107,99 0,1132 6,44 12,26 11,85 0 0
Telefonica 2008 0,2015 84,17 29,52 0,0774 112,36 0,151 4,88 9,29 9,09 0 0
Telefonica 2009 0,3747 69,63 32,21 0,0837 101,45 0,2572 2,65 4,66 4,38 0,00016 0,00059
Telefonica 2010 0,2032 81,12 34,83 0,0995 115,68 0,1425 4,91 9,05 8,41 0 0
Telefonica 2011 0,2624 80,74 37,41 0,0435 117,63 0,1801 3,79 6,51 6,35 0 0
Telefonica 2012 0,2714 58,92 36,95 0,0319 95,66 0,1672 3,67 5,8 5,64 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Total 2004 0,2622 97,17 8,39 0,1225 105,39 0,2417 3,81 10,85 10,43 0 0
Total 2005 0,1634 115,38 10,82 0,1485 125,96 0,1497 6,11 17,32 16,47 0 0
Total 2006 0,1723 129,73 12,95 0,1123 142,28 0,1571 5,79 15,89 15,37 0 0
Total 2007 0,1807 119,35 12,05 0,1262 130,9 0,1647 5,51 15,16 14,66 0 0
Total 2008 0,2048 109,79 15,82 0,0939 124,89 0,18 4,85 11,91 11,64 0 0
Total 2009 0,4792 89,99 16,71 0,072 106,49 0,4049 2,08 4,55 4,4 0,00027 0,00054
Total 2010 0,2982 99,43 20,04 0,0835 119,31 0,2485 3,35 7,39 7,09 0 0
Total 2011 0,2261 97,55 20,95 0,0862 118,21 0,1866 4,41 9,64 9,25 0 0
Total 2012 0,2456 98,32 22,15 0,0659 120,35 0,2006 4,07 8,66 8,36 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Vodafone 2004 0,2766 88,41 8,17 -0,056 96,41 0,2536 3,61 9,39 9,69 0 0
Vodafone 2005 0,2108 90,66 6,2 -0,053 96,72 0,1976 4,74 13,54 13,92 0 0
Vodafone 2006 0,1946 78,17 11,37 -0,1482 89,19 0,1706 5,12 11,12 12,17 0 0
Vodafone 2007 0,2558 75,55 13,31 -0,0461 88,3 0,2189 3,88 8,33 8,73 0 0
Vodafone 2008 0,269 79,32 15,37 0,0571 93,99 0,227 3,68 8,11 8,07 0 0
Vodafone 2009 0,4664 62,95 24,77 0,024 87,42 0,3359 2,13 3,66 3,62 0,01271 0,01455
Vodafone 2010 0,2957 77,98 24,86 0,0562 102,64 0,2247 3,37 6,45 6,23 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
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Vodafone 2011 0,1961 91,2 23,51 0,0508 114,39 0,1564 5,08 10,36 10,13 0 0
Vodafone 2012 0,217 85,12 20,44 0,0481 105,45 0,1752 4,6 9,55 9,31 0 0
firm’s name   year E DP µ V
Volvo 2004 0,3114 70,12 41,6 0,0417 110,86 0,197 3,17 5,09 4,98 0,00002 0,00003
Volvo 2005 0,2309 97,69 53,11 0,0599 149,65 0,1507 4,28 7,19 6,94 0 0
Volvo 2006 0,2216 103,01 47,6 0,0646 149,17 0,153 4,45 7,81 7,59 0 0
Volvo 2007 0,2572 170,33 76,56 0,0593 243,68 0,1798 3,82 6,68 6,59 0 0
Volvo 2008 0,3559 127,31 104,08 0,0318 226,68 0,1999 2,71 3,95 4,03 0,00386 0,00284
Volvo 2009 0,5615 61,51 103,85 -0,0407 163,97 0,2129 1,72 1,85 2,1 3,2344 1,80254
Volvo 2010 0,5267 107,36 80,45 0,034 187,14 0,3026 1,88 2,75 2,67 0,29721 0,38465
Volvo 2011 0,3183 155,38 86,67 0,0581 240,85 0,2053 3,12 5,16 4,94 0,00001 0,00004
Volvo 2012 0,4301 139,46 90,11 0,0324 229,06 0,2619 2,32 3,56 3,45 0,01887 0,02767
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Table 19: DD comparison per country - not defaulted European firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 6,45 10,83 12,14 12,13 5,45 2,42 4,67 8,13 9,73
Danimark 6,68 6,58 7,17 5,82 5,92 2,30 3,28 4,92 5,05
England 9,61 13,57 14,66 10,56 8,34 3,78 6,32 8,15 7,90
France 10,85 17,32 10,19 6,97 4,98 1,61 3,25 4,22 3,43
Germany 8,01 12,82 13,61 11,27 9,07 3,73 6,13 10,19 8,38
Italy 7,03 11,43 11,80 8,05 6,43 2,10 3,75 5,32 4,57
Netherlands 10,13 13,68 15,18 14,51 9,84 3,87 6,35 10,00 8,49
Spain 4,73 7,37 10,30 8,40 6,36 2,74 5,34 3,99 3,46
Sweden 6,52 10,03 11,72 7,73 5,89 2,49 3,73 6,73 5,49
Switzerland 12,56 18,03 22,84 24,40 22,63 6,80 11,18 14,77 12,44
average 8,26 12,17 12,96 10,98 8,49 3,18 5,40 7,64 6,89
Table 20: DD in USA  - not defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
non financial firms
Airgas 6,7 8,2 8,58 7,58 7,75 2,52 6,03 5,51 8,7
Caterpillar 5,92 7,03 7,26 6,03 7,42 2,59 3,17 6,09 4,92
General Electric 5,93 9,02 10,45 11,01 7,75 2,05 2,19 4,83 4,46
Grainger 24,41 32,81 32,73 17,52 15,45 7,59 12,55 15,08 14,55
Hewlett Packard 7,1 10,96 12,71 12,49 11,8 5,45 7,47 8,77 3,8
IBM 11,6 18,11 14,4 16,89 12,36 7,17 9,88 15,41 12,8
Intel 15,97 16,02 23,54 17,62 19 8,01 13,41 14,59 12,4
Nike 14,42 20,88 19,03 28,54 20,46 7,26 12,61 19,66 16,92
Procter & Gamble 19,97 17,38 18,29 19,36 18,33 7,21 10,9 19,21 17,92
Tesoro Corporation 3,45 4,38 5,51 7,66 4,88 1,35 2,48 5,17 3,77
Wesco International 3,09 5,68 5,61 4,7 4,9 2,16 3,33 7,1 4,23
Whirpool 7,95 9,49 7,56 8,7 6,64 2,36 2,96 5,01 5,1
average 10,54 13,33 13,81 13,18 11,40 4,64 7,25 10,54 9,13
financial firms
Bank of America 4,71 6,5 6,98 6,46 3,67 -0,46 0,04 2,04 1
Bank of New York 7,35 9,35 10,67 7,15 6,45 1,4 2,07 5,48 3,52
 Citygroup 4,37 6,27 6,68 5,27 1,57 -1,16 -0,06 2,07 1,39
JP Morgan 2,86 5,55 6,35 5,52 2,98 0,41 0,83 2,97 2,17
PNC Bank 7,23 8,16 9,63 6,68 4,06 1,34 0,78 3,94 3,52
Wells Fargo 7,77 11,14 11,65 9,34 3,18 0,81 0,77 3,99 3,46
average 5,72 7,83 8,66 6,74 3,65 0,39 0,74 3,42 2,51
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Table 21: DD comparison USA/EU  - not defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
average DD in USA 8,13 10,58 11,23 9,96 7,52 2,52 3,99 6,98 5,82
average DD in EU 8,26 12,17 12,96 10,98 8,49 3,18 5,40 7,64 6,89
Table 22: DD in EU - defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Allied Irish Bank NaN NaN NaN 2,76 1,02 -9,06 -1,75 -16,5 NaN
Anglo Irish Bank 3,8 4,01 3,9 3,64 0,67 NaN NaN NaN NaN
Roskilde  Bank 4,81 4,65 6,48 4,31 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Arcandor 2,12 2,3 6,45 4 3,73 NaN NaN NaN NaN
IT Holding 4,19 4,94 4,67 5,67 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
Stato Oil Hydro 13,49 12,86 11,83 8,87 10,67 NaN NaN NaN NaN
Waterford 1,44 0,53 0,21 0,74 -0,92 NaN NaN NaN NaN
average 4,98 4,88 5,59 4,28 3,03 -9,06 -1,75 -16,50 0,00
Table 23: DD in USA - defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
non financial firms
Blockbuster 2,55 3,46 0,91 Inf 4,43 1,22 2,38 NaN NaN
Delta Petroleum 6,54 3,83 4,49 3,99 2,59 -0,06 0,02 0,25 -0,25
General Maritime 4,82 7,18 11,97 9,07 2,96 1,22 0,69 1,13 NaN
GMX Resosurces 2,42 4,05 4,85 3,51 4,15 0,59 0,79 1,05 -0,28
Trailer Bridge 1,29 2,24 3,86 4,23 3,28 1,92 0,7 NaN NaN
Wolwerine 2,67 2,33 1,57 -0,79 0,31 NaN NaN NaN NaN
YRC Worldwide NaN NaN NaN 3,3 1,81 NaN -0,44 -1,99 NaN
average 3,38 3,85 4,61 3,89 2,79 0,98 0,69 0,11 -0,27
financial firms
Ambac Financial Group 5,45 7,54 4,66 5,52 -2,41 -1,47 -1,52 NaN NaN
Corus 11,62 9,1 8,67 6,02 2,84 NaN NaN NaN NaN
Indymac 2,35 1,96 1,85 1,64 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN
MF Global NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN -1,18 -1,85 -0,48 NaN
PMI Group 8,32 11,56 16,59 19,73 1,55 -0,68 -0,17 NaN NaN
average 6,94 7,54 7,94 8,23 0,66 -1,11 -1,18 -0,48 NaN
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Table 24: DD comparison USA/EU - defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
average DD in USA 5,16 5,69 6,28 6,06 1,73 -0,07 -0,25 -0,19 -0,265
average DD in EU 4,98 4,88 5,59 4,28 3,03 -9,06 -1,75 -16,50 0,00
Table 25: European, not defaulted - ranking per industry
Industry Firm name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ENERGY 
Bp 11,57 17,1 16,11 13,82 11,54 5,09 8,06 6 7,99
ENI 10,81 16,3 16,16 15,45 12,41 3,77 6,19 8,89 7,29
Anheuser 
Bush Inbev
6,45 10,83 12,14 12,13 5,45 2,42 4,67 8,13 9,73
Royal Dutch 
Shell
10,13 13,68 15,18 14,51 9,84 3,87 6,35 10 8,49
Total 10,85 17,32 15,89 15,16 11,91 4,55 7,39 9,64 8,66
Glaxosmithkl
ine
11,81 17,2 21,37 18,33 13,5 6,73 11,11 13,04 12,85
Riotinto 9,82 12,63 14,24 5,51 3,91 1,63 4,13 6,67 5,31
10,21 15,01 15,87 13,56 9,79 4,01 6,84 8,91 8,62
RETAIL AND CONSUMER GOODS Adidas
9,19 14,56 11,88 11,39 10,05 4,14 7,06 10,84 9
Luxottica 6,8 11,72 14,16 9,63 7,52 3,7 6,23 9,53 9,7
8,00 13,14 13,02 10,51 8,79 3,92 6,65 10,19 9,35
PHARMACEUTICAL Novartis
14,06 18,59 26,21 25,98 21,3 7,89 13,02 16,46 13,21
Roche 11,06 17,47 19,46 22,82 23,96 5,7 9,33 13,07 11,67
12,56 18,03 22,84 24,40 22,63 6,80 11,18 14,77 12,44
TELECOMMUNICATION AND 
TECHNOLOGIES
Vodafone 9,39 13,54 11,12 8,33 8,11 3,66 6,45 10,36 9,55
Telefonica 7,22 10,55 13,79 12,26 9,29 4,66 9,05 6,51 5,8
Siemens 6,83 11,07 15,33 11,15 8,09 3,32 5,19 9,54 7,76
7,81 11,72 13,41 10,58 8,50 3,88 6,90 8,80 7,70
TRANSPORT AND MOTOR 
VEHICLE
Maersk 6,68 6,58 7,17 5,82 5,92 2,3 3,28 4,92 5,05
Volvo 5,09 7,19 7,81 6,68 3,95 1,85 2,75 5,16 3,56
Saab 7,95 12,87 15,63 8,78 7,82 3,13 4,71 8,3 7,42
6,57 8,88 10,20 7,09 5,90 2,43 3,58 6,13 5,34
BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICE
Banco Bilbao 2,23 4,18 6,8 4,54 3,42 0,81 1,62 1,47 1,12
BNP Paribas NaN NaN NaN 2,67 1,38 -0,28 1,04 1,72 1,18
HSBC 5,44 7,39 10,44 6,82 4,65 1,78 1,84 4,7 3,81
Mediobanca 3,49 6,26 5,08 4,4 4,1 1,25 1,75 1,83 1,19
Societe 
Generale
NaN NaN 4,49 3,08 1,66 0,56 1,31 1,31 0,45
Unicredit NaN NaN NaN 2,7 1,7 -0,31 0,84 1,02 0,1
3,72 5,94 6,70 4,04 2,82 0,64 1,40 2,01 1,31
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Table 26: DD comparison per industry - European not defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
energy 10,21 15,01 15,87 13,56 9,79 4,01 6,84 8,91 8,62
retail and consumer goods 8,00 13,14 13,02 10,51 8,79 3,92 6,65 10,19 9,35
pharmaceutical 12,56 18,03 22,84 24,40 22,63 6,80 11,18 14,77 12,44
telecommunication and technologies 7,81 11,72 13,41 10,58 8,50 3,88 6,90 8,80 7,70
transport and motor vehicle 6,57 8,88 10,20 7,09 5,90 2,43 3,58 6,13 5,34
bank and financial service 3,72 5,94 6,70 4,04 2,82 0,64 1,40 2,01 1,31
Table 27: USA, not defaulted - ranking per industry
Industry Firm’s name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ENERGY
Airgas 6,7 8,2 8,58 7,58 7,75 2,52 6,03 5,51 8,7
General Electric 5,93 9,02 10,45 11,01 7,75 2,05 2,19 4,83 4,46
Tesoro Corporation 3,45 4,38 5,51 7,66 4,88 1,35 2,48 5,17 3,77
5,36 7,20 8,18 8,75 6,79 1,97 3,57 5,17 5,64
RETAIL AND CONSUMER 
GOODS
Grainger 24,41 32,81 32,73 17,52 15,45 7,59 12,55 15,08 14,55
Nike 14,42 20,88 19,03 28,54 20,46 7,26 12,61 19,66 16,92
Procter & Gamble 19,97 17,38 18,29 19,36 18,33 7,21 10,9 19,21 17,92
Whirpool 7,95 9,49 7,56 8,7 6,64 2,36 2,96 5,01 5,1
16,69 20,14 19,40 18,53 15,22 6,11 9,76 14,74 13,62
TELECOMMUNICATION AND 
TECHNOLOGIES
Hewlett Packard 7,1 10,96 12,71 12,49 11,8 5,45 7,47 8,77 3,8
IBM 11,6 18,11 14,4 16,89 12,36 7,17 9,88 15,41 12,8
Intel 15,97 16,02 23,54 17,62 19 8,01 13,41 14,59 12,4
Wesco International 3,09 5,68 5,61 4,7 4,9 2,16 3,33 7,1 4,23
9,44 12,69 14,07 12,93 12,02 5,70 8,52 11,47 8,31
TRANSPORT AND MOTOR 
VEHICLE
Caterpillar 5,92 7,03 7,26 6,03 7,42 2,59 3,17 6,09 4,92
5,92 7,03 7,26 6,03 7,42 2,59 3,17 6,09 4,92
BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICE
Bank of America 4,71 6,5 6,98 6,46 3,67 -0,46 0,04 2,04 1
Bank of New York 7,35 9,35 10,67 7,15 6,45 1,4 2,07 5,48 3,52
 Citygroup 4,37 6,27 6,68 5,27 1,57 -1,16 -0,06 2,07 1,39
JP Morgan 2,86 5,55 6,35 5,52 2,98 0,41 0,83 2,97 2,17
PNC Bank 7,23 8,16 9,63 6,68 4,06 1,34 0,78 3,94 3,52
Wells Fargo 7,77 11,14 11,65 9,34 3,18 0,81 0,77 3,99 3,46
5,72 7,83 8,66 6,74 3,65 0,39 0,74 3,42 2,51
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Table 28: DD comparison per industry - USA, not defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
energy 5,36 7,20 8,18 8,75 6,79 1,97 3,57 5,17 5,64
retail and consumer goods 16,69 20,14 19,40 18,53 15,22 6,11 9,76 14,74 13,62
telecommunication and technologies 9,44 12,69 14,07 12,93 12,02 5,70 8,52 11,47 8,31
transport and motor vehicle 5,92 7,03 7,26 6,03 7,42 2,59 3,17 6,09 4,92
bank and financial service 5,72 7,83 8,66 6,74 3,65 0,39 0,74 3,42 2,51
Table 29: comparison DDs in USA, defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2,57 2,63 2,53 3,00 1,92 0,49 0,57 1,07 0,44
4,63 5,16 5,68 5,42 2,07 0,22 0,40 0,48 -0,18
5,17 5,75 6,44 6,76 3,17 0,63 0,71 1,33 0,55average ! DDµ
average ! DDKMV
average ! DDrf
Table 30: comparison DDs in EU, defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
3,33 3,18 3,35 3,17 2,20 -0,40 -0,66 -1,33 —
5,34 5,25 5,99 4,85 3,61 -1,38 -1,13 -4,79 —
5,47 5,35 6,07 5,13 4,07 0,72 -0,64 0,62 —average ! DDµ
average ! DDKMV
average ! DDrf
Table 31: comparison DDs in USA, not defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
3,85 5,08 5,29 5,20 4,10 1,63 1,99 3,66 3,05
9,21 11,91 12,56 11,49 9,18 3,43 5,15 8,40 7,12
9,01 11,82 12,62 11,53 9,02 3,32 4,97 8,08 6,90average ! DDµ
average ! DDKMV
average ! DDrf
Table 32: comparison DDs in EU, not defaulted firms
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
3,66 5,25 5,75 4,93 4,20 2,00 2,75 3,70 3,31
8,49 12,58 13,68 10,93 8,73 3,47 5,55 7,61 6,83
8,28 12,21 13,48 10,85 8,81 3,43 5,39 7,42 6,64average ! DDµ
average ! DDKMV
average ! DDrf
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Appendix A: Volatility Estimation 
"
Volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns. Using standard deviation is the 
most common (but not the only way) to calculate historical volatility. 
To estimate the volatility of a stock price empirically, the stock price is usually 
observed at fixed intervals of time (daily, weekly or monthly). 
"
Let’s define: 
n+1= number of observations 
! = stock price at the end of the interval i 
"
Choosing an appropriate value for n is not easy. More data generally lead to more 
accuracy, but the volatility !  does not change over time and data that are too old may 
not be relevant for predicting the future volatility. 
"
Let’s say !  denotes the log return at time i: 
!  
The standard deviation of log returns is given by: 
!  
or 
!  
where !  denotes the mean of ! , S denotes the stock price and n the number of 
observations. 
Analytically: 
Si
σ
ui
ui = ln
Si
Si-1
σ = 1
n -1
(ui - u
i=1
n
∑ )2
σ = 1
n -1
ui2 -
1
n(n -1)
u i
i=1
n
∑⎛⎝
⎞
⎠
2
i=1
n
∑
u ui
!121
Appendix A
!  
where  
!  
and 
!             since        !  
"
Therefore:  
!  
Finally: 
"
"
is the daily volatility. 
The annualized historical volatility of equity is given by: 
!  
This is the annualized percent standard deviation of returns and it is estimated from the 
prior year stock return data. 
"
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Appendix B: Matlab codes 
"
Matlab code for estimating volatility: 
"
Function CPread: 
function [RES,RES_bad]=CPread(fileCPname,min_y,max_y,n)!
% ex: [RES,RES_bad]=CPread('ADIDAS-CP.dat',2004,2012,253)!
fid=fopen(fileCPname,'r');!
i=1;!
temp=fscanf(fid,'%s',1);!
while(temp~=' ')!
    ! ! date(i)=cellstr(temp);!
   ! !  fscanf(fid,'\t');!
  ! !   CP_value=fscanf(fid,'%s',1);!
  !  if(size(CP_value,2)==2 & CP_value=='NA')!
      !   fprintf('WARNING type4! "NA" in CP values present on:\t
%s\n',datestr(date(i)));!
   !  else!
       !  CP(i)=str2num(CP_value);!
! end!
i=i+1;!
temp=fscanf(fid,'%s',1);!
end!
date=date(1:size(CP,2));!
fclose(fid);!
date_n=datenum(date);%invers: datestr!
i=1;!
j=1;!
RES_bad=zeros(max_y-min_y+1,3);!
for temp_y=min_y:max_y!
    idx=[];!
    date_temp=[];!
    CP_temp=[];!
    min_t=strcat('01/01/',num2str(temp_y));!
    max_t=strcat('12/31/',num2str(temp_y));!
    idx=find(date_n>=datenum(min_t) & date_n<=datenum(max_t));!
    if(isempty(idx))!
  !  fprintf('WARNING type1! DATA MISSING IN THE PERIOD:\t%s - %s
\n',min_t,max_t);!
        RES_bad(i,1)=temp_y;!
        RES_bad(i,2)=NaN;!
        RES_bad(i,3)=length(CP_temp);!
        i=i+1;!
    else!
        date_temp=date(idx);!
        CP_temp=CP(idx);!
        [temp_miaVol,bool]=miaVOL(CP_temp,n);!
        RES_bad(i,1)=temp_y;!
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        RES_bad(i,2)=temp_miaVol;!
        RES_bad(i,3)=length(CP_temp);!
        if(bool==0)!
            RES(j,1)=temp_y;!
            RES(j,2)=temp_miaVol;!
            RES(j,3)=length(CP_temp);!
            j=j+1;!
        else!
            fprintf('WARNING type2 - %s - year:%s - n should be less 
than or equal to the length of the prices
\n',fileCPname,num2str(temp_y));!
        end!
        i=i+1;!
    end!
end!""""
Function miaVOL: 
function [vol,bool] = miaVOL(C,n)!
try!
C = [C];!
catch %#ok!
error('O H L C must be of the same size');!
rethrow(lasterror);!
end!
if(n<=length(C))!
    fh = @(x) x(length(x)-n+1:end);!
    close = fh(C); %C(length(C)-n+1:end);!
    Z = 252; %number of trading Days in a year!
    %vol.hccv = hccv(); %RB ???!
    vol = hccv();!
    bool=0;!
else!
    vol = NaN;!
    bool=1;!
    %fprintf('Warning - n should be less than or equal to the length 
of the prices\n');!
    %warning('n should be less than or equal to the length of the 
prices');!
end!"
function vol1 = hccv()!
%Historical volatility calculation using close prices.!
r = log(close(2:end)./close(1:end-1));!
rbar = mean(r);!
vol1 = sqrt((Z/(n-2)) * sum((r - rbar).^2));!
end!
end!
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Matlab code for solving the non linear system: 
"
Function system_solve: 
function 
[RESULTS3D]=system_solve(filenameout,filenameout2,CP3D,BS3D,TREASURY
,comp,flag_bank,lines_or_not)!"
for j=1:size(CP3D,3)!
    for i=2:size(CP3D,1)!
        fprintf('calcolo per azienda: %s,\tanno: %d
\n',char(comp(j)),CP3D(i,1,j));!
        E=BS3D(i,2,j);!
        DP=BS3D(i,3,j);!
        mu=BS3D(i,4,j);!
        rf=TREASURY(find(TREASURY(:,1)==CP3D(i,1,j)),2);!
        SigE=CP3D(i-1,2,j);!
        
if(sum([isnan(mu),isnan(E),isnan(SigE),isnan(DP),isnan(rf)])>0)!
            a=NaN;!
            V=NaN;!
            SigV=NaN;!
            DD=NaN;!
            DD1=NaN;!
            EDF1=NaN;!
            DD2=NaN;!
            EDF2=NaN;!
            if(flag_bank==1)!
                DC1=NaN;!
                PDC=NaN;!
            end!
        else!
            options=optimset('Display','final','MaxFunEvals',
10000000, 'MaxIter',10000000,'TolFun',1e-10,'TolX',1e-10);!
            %options=optimset('Display','final','MaxFunEvals',
10000000, 'MaxIter',10000000);!
            a=fsolve(@(x)myfun_agnese(x,DP,E,SigE,rf),
[E;SigE],options);!
            V=a(1,1);!
            SigV=a(2,1);!
            DD=(V-DP)/(SigV*V);!
            DD1=(log(V/DP)+(mu-(SigV^2)/2))/SigV;!
            DD2=(log(V/DP)+(rf-(SigV^2)/2))/SigV;!
            EDF1=1-normcdf(DD1,0,1);!
            EDF2=1-normcdf(DD2,0,1);!
            if(flag_bank==1)!
                DC1=(log(V/((1/(1-0.08))*DP))+(mu-(SigV^2)/2))/SigV;!
                PDC=1-normcdf(DC1,0,1);!
            end!
        end!
        RESULTS3D(i,1,j)=CP3D(i,1,j);!
        RESULTS3D(i,2,j)=V;!
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        RESULTS3D(i,3,j)=SigV;!
        RESULTS3D(i,4,j)=DD1;!
        RESULTS3D(i,5,j)=DD2;!
        RESULTS3D(i,6,j)=EDF1*100;!
        RESULTS3D(i,7,j)=EDF2*100;!
        RESULTS3D(i,10,j)=DD;!
        if(flag_bank==1)!
            RESULTS3D(i,8,j)=DC1;!
            RESULTS3D(i,9,j)=PDC*100;!
        end!
    end!
end!
out_files_print(RESULTS3D,filenameout,filenameout2,CP3D,BS3D,comp,fl
ag_bank,lines_or_not);!
"
"
"
"
Function myfun_agnese: 
function G=myfun_agnese(x,c1,c2,c3,R)!
d1=(log(x(1)/c1)+(R+(x(2)^2)/2))/x(2);!
G=[x(1)*normcdf(d1,0,1)-exp(-R)*c1*normcdf(d1-x(2),0,1)-
c2;normcdf(d1,0,1)*x(1)*x(2)/c2-c3];!
end  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